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THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT

PREFATORY NOTE

During the last thirty years the use of mediation has expanded beyond
its century-long home in collective bargaining to become an integral and
growing part of the processes of dispute resolution in the courts, public
agencies, community dispute resolution programs, and the commercial and
business communities, as well as among private parties engaged in conflict.
Public policy strongly supports this development. Mediation fosters
the early resolution of disputes. The mediator assists the parties in
negotiating a settlement that is specifically tailored to their needs and
interests. The parties' participation in the process and control over the
result contributes to greater satisfaction on their part. See Chris Guthrie &
James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective on a Comprehensive
Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 885 (1998). Increased
use of mediation also diminishes the unnecessary expenditure of personal
and institutional resources for conflict resolution, and promotes a more
civil society. For this reason, hundreds of state statutes establish mediation
programs in a wide variety of contexts and encourage their use. See SARAH
R. COLE, CRAIG A. MCEWEN & NANCY H. ROGERS, MEDIATION: LAW,

POLICY, PRACTICE App. B (2001 2d ed. and 2001 Supp.) (hereinafter,
COLE ET AL.). Many States have also created state offices to encourage
greater use of mediation. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. SECTION 16-7-101, et
seq. (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. Section 613-1, et seq. (1989); KAN. STAT.
ANN. SECTION 5-501, et seq. (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, Section 51

(1998); Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 25-2902, et seq. (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
Section 52:27E-73 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Section 179.01, et seq.
(West 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, Section 1801, et seq. (1983); OR. REV.
STAT. Section 36.105, et seq. (1997); W. VA. CODE Section 55-15-1, et
seq. (1990).
These laws play a limited but important role in encouraging the
effective use of mediation and maintaining its integrity, as well as the
appropriate relationship of mediation with the justice system. In particular,
the law has the unique capacity to assure that the reasonable expectations
of participants regarding the confidentiality of the mediation process are
met, rather than frustrated. For this reason, a central thrust of the Act is to
provide a privilege that assures confidentiality in legal proceedings (see
Sections 4-6). Because the privilege makes it more difficult to offer
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evidence to challenge the settlement agreement, the Drafters viewed the
issue of confidentiality as tied to provisions that will help increase the
likelihood that the mediation process will be fair. Fairness is enhanced if it
will be conducted with integrity and the parties' knowing consent will be
preserved. See Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairnessand Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J.
ON DiSP. RESOL. 909 (1998); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of SelfDetermination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of
Institutionalization?,6 HARv. NEG. L. REV. 1 (2001). The Act protects
integrity and knowing consent through provisions that provide exceptions
to the privilege (Section 6), limit disclosures by the mediator to judges and
others who may rule on the case (Section 7), require mediators to disclose
conflicts of interest (Section 9), and assure that parties may bring a lawyer
or other support person to the mediation session (Section 10). In some
limited ways, the law can also encourage the use of mediation as part of the
policy to promote the private resolution of disputes through informed selfdetermination. See discussion in Section 2; see also Nancy H. Rogers &
Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation
and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 831 (1998); Denburg v. Paker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624
N.E.2d 995, 1000 (N.Y. 1993) (societal benefit in recognizing the
autonomy of parties to shape their own solution rather than having one
judicially imposed). A uniform act that promotes predictability and
simplicity may encourage greater use of mediation, as discussed in part 3,
below.
At the same time, it is important to avoid laws that diminish the
creative and diverse use of mediation. The Act promotes the autonomy of
the parties by leaving to them those matters that can be set by agreement
and need not be set inflexibly by statute. In addition, some provisions in
the Act may be varied by party agreement, as specified in the comments to
the sections. This may be viewed as a core Act which can be amended
with type specific provisions not in conflict with the Uniform Mediation
Act.
The provisions in this Act reflect the intent of the Drafters to further
these public policies. The Drafters intend for the Act to be applied and
construed in a way to promote uniformity, as stated in Section, and also in
such manner as to:
. promote candor of parties through confidentiality of the
mediation process, subject only to the need for disclosure
to accommodate specific and compelling societal interests
(see part 1, below);
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. encourage the policy of fostering prompt, economical,
and amicable resolution of disputes in accordance with
principles of integrity of the mediation process, active
party involvement, and informed self-determination by the
parties (see part 2, below); and
. advance the policy that the decision-making authority in
the mediation process rests with the parties (see part 2,
below).
Although the Conference does not recommend "purpose" clauses,
States that permit these clauses may consider adapting these principles to
serve that function. Each is discussed in turn.
A. PROMOTING CANDOR

Candor during mediation is encouraged by maintaining the parties'
and mediators' expectations regarding confidentiality of mediation
communications. See Sections 4-6. Virtually all state legislatures have
recognized the necessity of protecting mediation confidentiality to
encourage the effective use of mediation to resolve disputes. Indeed, state
legislatures have enacted more than 250 mediation privilege statutes. See
COLE ET AL., supra, at apps. A and B. Approximately half of the States
have enacted privilege statutes that apply generally to mediations in the
State, while the other half include privileges within the provisions of
statutes establishing mediation programs for specific substantive legal
issues, such as employment or human rights. Id.
The Drafters recognize that mediators typically promote a candid and
informal exchange regarding events in the past, as well as the parties'
perceptions of and attitudes toward these events, and that mediators
encourage parties to think constructively and creatively about ways in
which their differences might be resolved. This frank exchange can be
achieved only if the participants know that what is said in the mediation
will not be used to their detriment through later court proceedings and other
adjudicatory processes. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Freedman and Michael L.
Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 37, 43-44 (1986); Philip J. Harter, Neither Cop Nor
Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative Settlements by Ensuring
Mediator Confidentiality, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 323-324 (1989); Alan
Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transformation from Theory to
Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect
Mediation Participants,the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP.
RESOL. 1, 17; Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation
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Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85
MARQUETTE L. REV. 79 (2001). For a critical perspective, see generally
Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1986); Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act:
To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 MARQUETTE L. REV. 9 (2001). Such
party-candor justifications for mediation confidentiality resemble those
supporting other communications privileges, such as the attorney-client
privilege, the doctor-patient privilege, and various other counseling
privileges. See, e.g., UN1F. R. EVID. R. 501-509 (1986); see generally
JACK

B.

WEINSTEIN,

ET.

AL,

EVIDENCE:

CASES AND

MATERIALS

1314-1315 (9th ed.1997); Developments in the Law- Privileged
Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450 (1985); PAUL R. RICE,

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES, SECTION 2/1-2.3

(2d ed. 1999). This rationale has sometimes been extended to mediators to
encourage mediators to be candid with the parties by allowing them to
block evidence of their notes and other statements by mediators. See, e.g.,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Section 2317.023 (West 1996).
Similarly, public confidence in and the voluntary use of mediation can
be expected to expand if people have confidence that the mediator will not
take sides or disclose their statements, particularly in the context of other
investigations or judicial processes. The public confidence rationale has
been extended to permit the mediator to object to testifying, so that the
mediator will not be viewed as biased in future mediation sessions that
involve comparable parties. See, e.g., NLRB v. Macaluso, 618 F.2d 51
(9th Cir. 1980) (public interest in maintaining the perceived and actual
impartiality of mediators outweighs the benefits derivable from a given
mediator's testimony). To maintain public confidence in the fairness of
mediation, a number of States prohibit a mediator from disclosing
mediation communications to a judge or other officials in a position to
affect the decision in a case. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, Section 712(c)
(1998) (employment discrimination); FLA. STAT. ANN. Section 760.34(1)
(1997) (housing discrimination); GA. CODE ANN. Section 8-3-208(a)
(1990) (housing discrimination); NEB. REV. STAT. Section 20-140 (1973)
(public accommodations); NEB. REV. STAT. Section 48-1118 (1993)
(employment discrimination); CAL. EVID. CODE Section 703.5 (West
1994). This justification also is reflected in standards against the use of a
threat of disclosure or recommendation to pressure the parties to accept a
particular settlement. See, e.g., CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT,
NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS
(1994); SOCIETY FOR PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS (1991); see also Craig A.
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McEwen & Laura Williams, Legal Policy and Access to Justice Through
Courts and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 831, 874 (1998).
A statute is required only to assure that aspect of confidentiality that
relates to evidence compelled in a judicial and other legal proceeding. The
parties can rely on the mediator's assurance of confidentiality in terms of
mediator disclosures outside the proceedings, as the mediator would be
liable for a breach of such an assurance. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (First Amendment does not bar recovery against
a newspaper's breach of promise of confidentiality); Home v. Patton, 291
Ala. 701, 287 So.2d 824 (1973) (physician disclosure may be invasion of
privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract). Also, the parties can
expect enforcement of their agreement to keep things confidential through
contract damages and sometimes specific enforcement. The courts have
also enforced court orders or rules regarding nondisclosure through orders
striking pleadings and fining lawyers. See Section 8; see also Parazino v.
Barnett Bank of South Florida, 690 So.2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997);
Bernard v. Galen Group, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Promises, contracts, and court rules or orders are unavailing, however, with
respect to discovery, trial, and otherwise compelled or subpoenaed
evidence. Assurance with respect to this aspect of confidentiality has
rarely been accorded by common law. Thus, the major contribution of the
Act is to provide a privilege in legal proceedings, where it would otherwise
either not be available or would not be available in a uniform way across
the States.
As with other privileges, the mediation privilege must have limits, and
nearly all existing state mediation statutes provide them. Definitions and
exceptions primarily are necessary to give appropriate weight to other valid
justice system values, in addition to those already discussed in this Section.
They often apply to situations that arise only rarely, but might produce
grave injustice in that unusual case if not excepted from the privilege.
In this regard, the Drafters recognize that the credibility and integrity
of the mediation process is almost always dependent upon the neutrality
and the impartiality of the mediator. The provisions of this Act are not
intended to provide the parties with an unwarranted means to bring
mediators into the discovery or trial process to testify about matters that
occurred during a court ordered or agreed mediation. There are of course
exceptions and they are specifically provided for in Section 5(a)(1),
(express waiver by the mediator) or pursuant to Section 6's narrow
exceptions such as 6(b)(1), (felony). Contrary use of the provisions of this
Act to involve mediators in the discovery or trial process would have a
destructive effect on the mediation process and would not be in keeping
with the intent and purpose of the Act.
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Finally, these exceptions need not significantly hamper candor. Once
the parties and mediators know the protections and limits, they can adjust
their conduct accordingly. For example, if the parties understand that they
will not be able to establish in court an oral agreement reached in
mediation, they can reduce the agreement to a record or writing before
relying on it. Although it is important to note that mediation is not
essentially a truth-seeking process in our justice system such as discovery,
if the parties realize that they will be unable to show that another party lied
during mediation, they can ask for corroboration of the statement made in
mediation prior to relying on the accuracy of it. A uniform and generic
privilege makes it easier for the parties and mediators to understand what
law will apply and therefore to understand the coverage and limits of the
Act, so that they can conduct themselves in a mediation accordingly.
B. ENCOURAGING RESOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH OTHER PRINCIPLES

Mediation is a consensual process in which the disputing parties
decide the resolution of their dispute themselves with the help of a
mediator, rather than having a ruling imposed upon them. The parties'
participation in mediation, often accompanied by counsel, allows them to
reach results that are tailored to their interests and needs, and leads to their
greater satisfaction in the process and results. Moreover, disputing parties
often reach settlement earlier through mediation, because of the expression
of emotions and exchanges of information that occur as part of the
mediation process.
Society at large benefits as well when conflicts are resolved earlier
and with greater participant satisfaction. Earlier settlements can reduce the
disruption that a dispute can cause in the lives of others affected by the
dispute, such as the children of a divorcing couple or the customers, clients
and employees of businesses engaged in conflict. See generally, JEFFREY
RUBIN, DEAN PRUITT AND SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT:
ESCALATION, STALEMATE AND SETTLEMENT 68-116 (2d ed. 1994)
(discussing reasons for, and manner and consequences of conflict
escalation). When settlement is reached earlier, personal and societal
resources dedicated to resolving disputes can be invested in more
productive ways. The public justice system gains when those using it feel
satisfied with the resolution of their disputes because of their positive
experience in a court-related mediation. Finally, mediation can also
produce important ancillary effects by promoting an approach to the
resolution of conflict that is direct and focused on the interests of those
involved in the conflict, thereby fostering a more civil society and a richer
discussion of issues basic to policy. See Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A.
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McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to
EncourageDirect and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
831 (1998); see also Frances McGovern, Beyond Efficiency: A Bevy of
ADR Justifications (An Unfootnoted Summary), 3 DISP. RESOL. MAG.
12-13 (1997); Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structuresfor the Delivery of
ADR Services by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 715 (1999); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (discussion

the causes for the decline of civic engagement and ways of ameliorating the
situation).
State courts and legislatures have perceived these benefits, as well as
the popularity of mediation, and have publicly supported mediation through
funding and statutory provisions that have expanded dramatically over the
last twenty years. See, COLE ET AL., supra 5:1-5:19; Richard C. Reuben,
The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, 82 A.B.A. J. 54 (Aug. 1996). The
legislative embodiment of this public support is more than 2500 state and
federal statutes and many more administrative and court rules related to
mediation. See COLE ET AL, supra apps. A and B.
The primary guarantees of fairness within mediation are the integrity
of the process and informed self-determination. Self-determination also
contributes to party satisfaction. Consensual dispute resolution allows
parties to tailor not only the result but also the process to their needs, with
minimal intervention by the State. For example, parties can agree with the
mediator on the general approach to mediation, including whether the
mediator will be evaluative or facilitative. This party agreement is a
flexible means to deal with expectations regarding the desired style of
mediation, and so increases party empowerment. Indeed, some scholars
have theorized that individual empowerment is a central benefit of
mediation. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE

PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994).
Self-determination is encouraged by provisions that limit the potential
for coercion of the parties to accept settlements, see Section 9(a), and that
allow parties to have counsel or other support persons present during the
mediation session. See Section 10. The Act promotes the integrity of the
mediation process by requiring the mediator to disclose conflicts of
interest, and to be candid about qualifications. See Section 9.
C. IMPORTANCE OF UNIFORMITY

This Act is designed to simplify a complex area of the law. Currently,
legal rules affecting mediation can be found in more than 2500 statutes.
Many of these statutes can be replaced by the Act, which applies a generic
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approach to topics that are covered in varying ways by a number of specific
statutes currently scattered within substantive provisions.
Existing statutory provisions frequently vary not only within a State
but also by State in several different and meaningful respects. The
privilege provides an important example. Virtually all States have adopted
some form of privilege, reflecting a strong public policy favoring
confidentiality in mediation. However, this policy is effected through more
than 250 different state statutes. Common differences among these statutes
include the definition of mediation, subject matter of the dispute, scope of
protection, exceptions, and the context of the mediation that comes within
the statute (such as whether the mediation takes place in a court or
community program or a private setting).
Uniformity of the law helps bring order and understanding across state
lines, and encourages effective use of mediation in a number of ways.
First, uniformity is a necessary predicate to predictability if there is any
potential that a statement made in mediation in one State may be sought in
litigation or other legal processes in another State. For this reason, the
UMA will benefit those States with clearly established law or traditions,
such as Texas, California, and Florida, ensuring that the privilege for
mediation communications made within those States is respected in other
States in which those mediation communications may be sought. The law
of privilege does not fit neatly into a category of either substance or
procedure, making it difficult to predict what law will apply. See, e.g., U.S.
v. Gullo, 672 F.Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that New York
mediation-arbitration privilege applies in federal court grand jury
proceeding); Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, 614 So.2d 517 (Fla. App.
1992) (holding that Florida mediation privilege law applies in federal Jones
Act claim brought in Florida court). Moreover, parties to a mediation
cannot always know where the later litigation or administrative process
may occur. Without uniformity, there can be no firm assurance in any
State that a mediation is privileged. Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for
Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial
Predictability?,85 MARQUETTE L. REv.79 (2001).
A second benefit of uniformity relates to cross-jurisdictional
mediation. Mediation sessions are increasingly conducted by conference
calls between mediators and parties in different States and even over the
Internet. Because it is unclear which State's laws apply, the parties cannot
be assured of the reach of their home state's confidentiality protections.
A third benefit of uniformity is that a party trying to decide whether to
sign an agreement to mediate may not know where the mediation will
occur and therefore whether the law will provide a privilege or the right to
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bring counsel or support person. Uniformity will add certainty on these
issues, and thus allows for more informed party self-determination.
Finally, uniformity contributes to simplicity. Mediators and parties
who do not have meaningful familiarity with the law or legal research
currently face a more formidable task in understanding multiple
confidentiality statutes that vary by and within relevant States than they
would in understanding a Uniform Act. Mediators and parties often travel
to different States for the mediation sessions. If they do not understand
these legal protections, participants may react in a guarded way, thus
reducing the candor that these provisions are designed to promote, or they
may unnecessarily expend resources to have the legal research conducted.
D. RIPENESS OF A UNIFORM LAW

The drafting of the Uniform Mediation Act comes at an opportune
moment in the development of the law and the mediation field.
First, States in the past thirty years have been able to engage in
considerable experimentation in terms of statutory approaches to
mediation, just as the mediation field itself has experimented with different
approaches and styles of mediation. Over time clear trends have emerged,
and scholars and practitioners have a reasonable sense as to which types of
legal standards are helpful, and which kinds are disruptive. The Drafters
have studied this experimentation, enabling state legislators to enact the
Act with the confidence that can only come from learned experience. See
Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 787, 788 (1998).
Second, as the use of mediation becomes more common and better
understood by policymakers, States are increasingly recognizing the
benefits of a unified statutory environment for privilege that cuts across all
applications. This modem trend is seen in about half of the States that have
adopted statutes of general application, and these broad statutes provide
guidance on effective approaches to a more general privilege. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 12-2238 (West 1993); ARK. CODE ANN.
Section 16-7-206 (1993); CAL. EVID. CODE Section 1115, et seq. (West
1997); IOWA CODE Section 679C.2 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN.
Section 60-452 (1964); LA. REV. STAT. Ann. Section 9:4112 (1997); ME.
R. EVID. Section 408 (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, Section 23C
(1985);

MINN.

STAT. ANN. Section 595.02 (1996);

NEB. REV. STAT.

Section 25-2914 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. Section 48.109(3) (1993); N.J.
REV. STAT. Section 2A:23A-9 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
Section 2317.023 (West 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, Section 1805 (1983);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 36.220 (1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
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Section 5949 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS Section 9-19-44 (1992); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS Section 19-13-32 (1998); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
Section 154.053 (c) (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. Section 30-3-38(4) (2000);
VA. CODE ANN. Section 8.01-576.10 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE
Section 5.60.070 (1993); Wis. STAT. Section 904.085(4)(a) (1997); WYO.
STAT. ANN. Section 1-43-103 (1991).
E. A PRODUCT OF A CONSENSUAL PROCESS

The Mediation Act results from an historic collaboration. The
Uniform Law Commission Drafting Committee, chaired by Judge Michael
B. Getty, was joined in the drafting of this Act by a Drafting Committee
sponsored by the American Bar Association, working through its Section of
Dispute Resolution, which was co-chaired by former American Bar
Association President Roberta Cooper Ramo (Modrall, Sperling, Roehl,
Harris & Sisk, P.A.) and Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. The leadership of both organizations had recognized that
the time was ripe for a uniform law on mediation. While both Drafting
Committees were independent, they worked side by side, sharing resources
and expertise in a collaboration that augmented the work of both Drafting
Committees by broadening the diversity of their perspectives. See Michael
B. Getty, Thomas J. Moyer & Roberta Cooper Ramo, Preface to
Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 OHIO ST. J.
ON DIsP. RESOL. 787 (1998). For instance, the Drafting Committees
represented various contexts in which mediation is used: private mediation,
court-related mediation, community mediation, and corporate mediation.
Similarly, they also embraced a spectrum of viewpoints about the goals of
mediation - efficiency for the parties and the courts, the enhancement of
the possibility of fundamental reconciliation of the parties, and the
enrichment of society through the use of less adversarial means of
resolving disputes. They also included a range of viewpoints about how
mediation is to be conducted, including, for example, strong proponents of
both the evaluative and facilitative models of mediation, as well as
supporters and opponents of mandatory mediation.
Finally, with the assistance of a grant from the William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation, both Drafting Committees had substantial academic
support for their work by many of mediation's most distinguished scholars,
who volunteered their time and energies out of their belief in the utility and
timeliness of a uniform mediation law. These included members of the
faculties of Harvard Law School, the University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law, the Ohio State University College of Law, and Bowdoin
College, including Professors Frank E.A. Sander (Harvard Law School);
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Chris Guthrie, John Lande, James Levin, Richard C. Reuben, Leonard L.
Riskin, Jean R. Stemlight (University of Missouri-Columbia School of
Law); James Brudney, Sarah R. Cole, L. Camille Hbert, Nancy H. Rogers,
Joseph B. Stulberg, Laura Williams, and Charles Wilson (Ohio State
University College of Law); Jeanne Clement (Ohio State University
College of Nursing); and Craig A. McEwen (Bowdoin College). The
Hewlett support also made it possible for the Drafting Committees to bring
noted scholars and practitioners from throughout the nation to advise the
Committees on particular issues. These are too numerous to mention but
the Committees especially thank those who came to meetings at the
advisory group's request, including Peter Adler, Christine Carlson, Jack
Hanna, Eileen Pruett, and Professors Ellen Deason, Alan Kirtley,
Kimberlee K. Kovach, Thomas J. Stipanowich, and Nancy Welsh.
Their scholarly work for the project examined the current legal
structure and effectiveness of existing mediation legislation, questions of
quality and fairness in mediation, as well as the political environment in
which uniform or model legislation operates. See Frank E.A. Sander,
Introduction to Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act,
13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 791 (1998). Much of this work was
published as a law review symposium issue. See Symposium on Drafting a
Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 787
(1998).
Finally, observers from a vast array of mediation professional and
provider organizations also provided extensive suggestions to the Drafting
Committees, including: the Association for Conflict Resolution (formerly
the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Academy of Family
Mediators and CRE/Net), National Council of Dispute Resolution
Organizations, American Arbitration Association, Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc.
(JAMS), CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, International Academy of
Mediators, National Association for Community Mediation, and the
California Dispute Resolution Council. Other official observers to the
Drafting Committees included: the American Bar Association Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, American Bar Association
Section of Litigation, American Bar Association Senior Lawyers Division,
American Bar Association Section of Torts and Insurance Practice,
American Trial Lawyers Association, Equal Employment Advisory
Council, National Association of District Attorneys, and the Society of
Professional Journalists.
Similarly, the Act also received substantive comments from several
state and local Bar Associations, generally working through their ADR
committees, including: the Alameda County Bar Association, the Beverly
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Hills Bar Association, the State Bar of California, the Chicago Bar
Association, the Louisiana State Bar Association, the Minnesota State Bar
Association, and the Mississippi Bar. In addition, the Committees' work
was supplemented by other individual mediators and mediation
professional organizations too numerous to mention.
F. DRAFTING PHILOSOPHY

Mediation often involves both parties and mediators from a variety of
professions and backgrounds, many of who are not attorneys or represented
by counsel. With this in mind, the Drafters sought to make the provisions
accessible and understandable to readers from a variety of backgrounds,
sometimes keeping the Act shorter by leaving some discretion in the courts
to apply the provisions in accordance with the general purposes of the Act,
delineated and expanded upon in Section 1 of this Prefatory Note. These
policies include fostering prompt, economical, and amicable resolution,
integrity in the process, self-determination by parties, candor in
negotiations, societal needs for information, and uniformity of law.
The Drafters sought to avoid including in the Act those types of
provisions that should vary by type of program or legal context and that

were therefore more appropriately left to program-specific statutes or rules.
Mediator qualifications, for example, are not prescribed by this Act. The
Drafters also recognized that some general standards are often better
applied through those who administer ethical standards or local rules,
where an advisory opinion might be sought to guide persons faced with
immediate uncertainty. Where individual choice or notice was important to
allow for self-determination or avoid a trap for the unwary, such as for
nondisclosure by the parties outside the context of proceedings, the
Drafters left the matter largely to local rule or contract among the
As the result, the Act largely governs those narrow
participants.
circumstances in which the mediation process comes into contact with
formal legal processes.
Finally, the Drafters operated with respect for local customs and
practices by using the Act to establish a floor rather than a ceiling for some
protections. It is not the intent of the Act to preempt state and local court
rules that are consistent with the Act, such as those well-established rules in
Florida. See, e.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. Rule 1.720; see also Sections 12 and 15.
Consistent with existing approaches in law, and to avoid unnecessary
disruption, the Act adopts the structure used by the overwhelming majority
of these general application States: the evidentiary privilege. However,
many state and local laws do not conflict with the Act and would not be
preempted by it. For example, statutes and court rules providing standards
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for mediators, setting limits of compulsory participation in mediation, and
providing mediator qualifications would remain in force.
The matter may be less clear if the existing provisions relate to the
mediation privilege. Legislative notes provide guidance on some key
issues. Nevertheless, in order to achieve the simplicity and clarity sought
by the Act, it will be important in each State to review existing privilege
statutes and specify in Section 15 which will be repealed and which will
remain in force.
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THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT

SECTION 1. TITLE

This [Act] may be cited as the Uniform Mediation Act.
SECTION

2. DEFINITIONS

In this [Act]:
(1) "Mediation" means a process in which a mediator facilitates
communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in
reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.
(2) "Mediation communication" means a statement, whether oral or
in a record or verbal or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is
made for purposes of considering, conducting, participating in,
initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a
mediator.
(3) "Mediator" means an individual who conducts a mediation.
(4) "Nonparty participant" means a person, other than a party or
mediator, that participates in a mediation.
(5) "Mediation party" means a person that participates in a mediation
and whose agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute.
(6) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate,
trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture,
government; governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality;
public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(7) "Proceeding" means:
(A) a judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative
process, including related pre-hearing and post-hearing motions,
conferences, and discovery; or
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(B) a legislative hearing or similar process.
(8) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceivable form.
(9) "Sign" means:
(A) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol with the present intent
to authenticate a record; or
(B) to attach or logically associate an electronic symbol, sound,
or process to or with a record with the present intent to
authenticate a record.
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REPORTER'S NOTES

1. SECTION 2(1). "MEDIATION."

The emphasis on negotiation in this definition is intended to exclude
adjudicative processes, such as arbitration and fact-finding, as well as
counseling. It was not intended to distinguish among styles or approaches
to mediation. An earlier draft used the word "conducted," but the Drafting
Committees preferred the word "assistance" to emphasize that, in contrast
to an arbitration, a mediator has no authority to issue a decision. The use of
the word "facilitation" is not intended to express a preference with regard
The Drafters recognize approaches to
to approaches of mediation.
mediation will vary widely.
2. SECTION 2(2). "MEDIATION COMMUNICATION."
Mediation communications are statements that are made orally,
through conduct, or in writing or other recorded activity. This definition is
aimed primarily at the privilege provisions of Sections 4-6. It is similar to
the general rule, as reflected in Uniform Rule of Evidence 801, which
defines a "statement" as "an oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct
of an individual who intends it as an assertion." Most generic mediation
privileges cover communications but do not cover conduct that is not
intended as an assertion. ARK. CODE ANN. Section 16-7-206 (1993); CAL.
EvID. CODE Section 1119 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. Section 44.102
(1999); IOWA CODE ANN. Section 679C.3 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN.
Section 60-452a (1964) (assertive representations); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
233, Section 23C (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. Section 26-1-813 (1999);
NEB. REV. STAT. Section 25-2914 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. Section 252914 (1997) (assertive representations); N.C. GEN. STAT. 7A-38.1(1)
(1995); N.J. REV. STAT. Section 2A:23A-9 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
Section 2317.023 (West 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, Section 1805 (1983);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 36.220 (1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

Section 5949 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS Section 9-19-44 (1992); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS Section 19-13-32 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. Section 8.01576.10 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE Section 5.60.070 (1993); WIS. STAT.
Section 904.085(4)(a) (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. Section 1-43-103 (1991).
The mere fact that a person attended the mediation - in other words, the
physical presence of a person - is not a communication. By contrast,
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nonverbal conduct such as nodding in response to a question would be a
"communication" because it is meant as an assertion, however
nonverbal
conduct such as smoking a cigarette during the mediation session typically
would not be a "communication" because it was not meant by the actor as
an assertion.
A mediator's mental impressions and observations about the

mediation present a more complicated question, with important practical

implications. See Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F.Supp. 2d 1110
(N.D. Cal. 1999). As discussed below, the mediation privilege is modeled
after, and draws heavily upon, the attorney-client privilege, a strong
privilege that is supported by well-developed case law. Courts are to be
expected to look to that well developed body of law in construing this Act.
In this regard, mental impressions that are based even in part on mediation
communications would generally be protected by privilege.
More specifically, communications include both statements and
conduct meant to inform, because the purpose of the privilege is to promote
candid mediation communications. U.S. v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 911, 975
(5th Cir., 1997). By analogy to the attorney-client privilege, silence in
response to a question may be a communication, if it is meant to inform.
U.S. v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 n.2 (7 th Cir., 1991). Further, conduct
meant to explain or communicate a fact, such as the re-enactment of an
accident, is a communication. See WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
503.14 (2000). Similarly, a client's revelation of a hidden scar to an
attorney in response to a question is a communication if meant to inform.
In contrast, a purely physical phenomenon, such as a tattoo or the color of a
suit of clothes, observable by all, is not a communication.
If evidence of mental impressions would reveal, even indirectly,
mediation communications, then that evidence would be blocked by the
privilege. Gunther v. U.S., 230 F.2d 222, 223-224 (D.C. Cir. 1956). For
example, a mediator's mental impressions of the capacity of a mediation
participant to enter into binding mediated settlement agreement would be
privileged if that impression was in part based on the statements that the
party made during the mediation, because the testimony might reveal the
content or character of the mediation communications upon which the
impression is based. In contrast, the mental impression would not be
privileged if it was based exclusively on the mediator's observation of that
party wearing heavy clothes and an overcoat on a hot summer day because
the choice of clothing was not meant to inform. Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d
767, 774 ( 9th Cir. 1979).
There is no justification for making readily observable conduct
privileged, certainly not more privileged than it is under the attorney-client
privilege. If the conduct is seen in the mediation room, it can also be
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observed, even photographed, outside of the mediation room, as well as in
other contexts. One of the primary reasons for making mediation
communications privileged is to promote candor, and excluding evidence
of a readily observable characteristic is not necessary to promote candor.
In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 (71h Cir., 1980).
The provision makes clear that conversations to initiate mediation and
other non-session communications that are related to a mediation are
considered "mediation communications." Most statutes are silent on the
question of whether they cover conversations to initiate mediation.
However, candor during these initial conversations is critical to insuring a
thoughtful agreement to mediate, and the Act therefore extends
confidentiality to these conversations to encourage that candor.
The definition in Section 2(2) is narrowly tailored to permit the
application of the privilege to protect communications that a party would
reasonably believe would be confidential, such as the explanation of the
matter to an intake clerk for a community mediation program, and
communications between a mediator and a party that occur between formal
mediation sessions. These would be communications "made for the
purposes of considering, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation
or retaining a mediator." This language protects the confidentiality of such
a communication when doing so advances the underlying policies of the
privilege, while at the same time gives the courts the latitude to restrict the
application of the privilege in situations where such an application of the
privilege would constitute an abuse. For example, an individual trying to
hide information from a court might later attempt to characterize a call to
an acquaintance about a dispute as an inquiry to the acquaintance about the
possibility of mediating the dispute. This definition would permit the court
to disallow a communication privilege, and admit testimony from that
acquaintance by finding that the communication was not "made for the
purposes of initiating considering, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a
mediation or retaining a mediator."
Responding in part to public concerns about the complexity of earlier
drafts, the Drafting Committees also elected to leave the question of when a
mediation ends to the sound judgment of the courts to determine according
to the facts and circumstances presented by individual cases. See Bidwell
v. Bidwell, 173 Or. App. 288 (2001) (ruling that letters between attorneys
for the parties that were sent after referral to mediation and related to
settlement were mediation communications and therefore privileged under
the Oregon statute). In weighing language about when a mediation ends,
the Drafting Committees considered other more specific approaches for
One approach in particular would have
answering these questions.
terminated the mediation after a specified period of time if the parties failed
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to reach an agreement, such as the 10-day period specified in CAL. EVID.
CODE Section] 125 (West 1997) (general).
However, the Drafting
Committee rejected that approach because it felt that such a requirement
could be easily circumvented by a routine practice of extending mediation
in a form mediation agreement. Indeed, such an extension in a form
agreement could result in the coverage of communications unrelated to the
dispute for years to come, without furthering the purposes of the privilege.
Finally, this definition would also include mediation "briefs" and
other reports that are prepared by the parties for the mediator. Whether the
document is prepared for the mediation is a crucial issue. For example, a
tax return brought to a divorce mediation would not be a "mediation
communication" because it was not a "statement made as part of the
mediation," even though it may have been used extensively in the
mediation. However, a note written on the tax return to clarify a point for
other participants would be a mediation communication. Similarly, a
memorandum specifically prepared for the mediation by the party or the
party's representative explaining the rationale behind certain positions
taken on the tax return would be a "mediation communication." Documents
prepared for the mediation by expert witnesses attending the mediation
would also be covered by this definition. See Section 4(b)(3).
3. SECTION 2(3). "MEDIATOR."

Several points are worth stressing with regard to the definition of
mediator. First, this definition should be read in conjunction with Section
9(c), which makes clear that the Act does not require that a mediator have a
special qualification by background or profession. Second, this definition
should be read in conjunction with the model language in Section 9(a)
through (e) on disclosures of conflicts of interest. Finally, the use of the
word "conducts" is intended to be value neutral, and should not be read to
express a preference for the manner by which mediations are conducted.
Compare Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,
Strategies, and Tactics: A Gridfor the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 7
(1996) with Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative vs. Evaluative Mediator
Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985
(1997)
4. SECTION 2(4). "NONPARTY PARTICIPANT."
This definition would cover experts, friends, support persons,
potential parties, and others who participate in the mediation. The
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definition is pertinent to the privilege accorded nonparty participants in
Section 4(b)(3), and to the ability of parties to bring attorneys or support
persons in Section 10. In the event that an attorney is deemed to be a
nonparty participant, that attorney would be constricted in exercising that
right by ethical provisions requiring the attorney to act in ways that are
consistent with the interests of the client. See MODEL RULE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.3 (Diligence. A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.); and Rule
1.6(a) (Confidentiality of Information. A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents
after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).).
5. SECTION 2(5). "MEDIATION PARTY."
The Act defines "mediation party" to be a person who participates in a
mediation and whose agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute. These
limitations are designed to prevent someone with only a passing interest in
the mediation, such as a neighbor of a person embroiled in a dispute, from
attending the mediation and then blocking the use of information or taking
advantage of rights meant to be accorded to parties. Such a person would
be a non-party participant and would have only a limited privilege. See
Section 4(b)(3). Similarly, counsel for a mediation party would not be a
mediation party, because their agreement is not necessary to the resolution
of the dispute.
Because of these structural limitations on the definition of parties,
participants who do not meet the definition of "mediation party," such as a
witness or expert on a given issue, do not have the substantial rights under
additional sections that are provided to parties. Rather, these non-party
participants are granted a more limited privilege under Section 4(b)(3).
Parties seeking to apply restrictions on disclosures by such participants including their attorneys and other representatives - should consider
drafting such a confidentiality obligation into a valid and binding
agreement that the participant signs as a condition of participation in the
mediation.
A mediation party may participate in the mediation in person, by
phone, or electronically. A person, as defined in Section 2(6), may
participate through a designated agent. If the party is an entity, it is the
entity, rather than a particular agent, that holds the privilege afforded in
Sections 4-6.
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6. SECTION 2(6). "PERSON."

Sections 2(6) adopts the standard language recommended by the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws for the
drafting of statutory language, and the term should be interpreted in a
manner consistent with that usage.
7.

SECTION

2(7).

"PROCEEDING."

Section 2(7) defines the proceedings to which the Act applies, and
should be read broadly to effectuate the intent of the Act. It was added to
allow the Drafters to delete repetitive language throughout the Act, such as
judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative processes, including
related pre-hearing and post-hearing motions, conferences, and discovery,
or legislative hearings or similar processes.
8.

SECTION

2(8).

"RECORD" AND SECTION

2(9).

"SIGN."

These Sections adopt standard language approved by the Uniform
Law Conference that is intended to conform Uniform Acts with the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) and its federal counterpart,
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign) (15
U.S.C 7001, et seq. (2000).
Both UETA and E-Sign were written in response to broad recognition
of the commercial and other use of electronic technologies for
communications and contracting, and the consensus that the choice of
medium should not control the enforceability of transactions. These
Sections are consistent with both UETA and E-Sign. UETA has been
adopted by the Conference and received the approval of the American Bar
Association House of Delegates. As of December 2001, it had been
enacted in more than 35 states. See also Section 11, Relation to Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.
The practical effect of these provisions is to make clear that electronic
signatures and documents have the same authority as written ones for
purposes of establishing an agreement to mediate under Section 3(a), party
opt-out of the mediation privilege under Section 3(c), and participant
waiver of the mediation privilege under Section 5(a).
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SECTION

3. SCOPE

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (c), this [Act]
applies to a mediation in which:
(1) the mediation parties are required to mediate by statute or
court or administrative agency rule or referred to mediation by a
court, administrative agency, or arbitrator;
(2) the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a
record that demonstrates an expectation that mediation
communications will be privileged against disclosure; or
(3) the mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who
holds himself or herself out as a mediator or the mediation is
provided by a person that holds itself out as providing mediation.
(b) The [Act] does not apply to a mediation:
(1) relating to the establishment, negotiation, administration, or
termination of a collective bargaining relationship;
(2) relating to a dispute that is pending under or is part of the
processes established by a collective bargaining agreement,
except that the [Act] applies to a mediation arising out of a
dispute that has been filed with an administrative agency or
court;
(3) conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case; or
(4) conducted under the auspices of:
(A) a primary or secondary school if all the parties are
students or
(B) a correctional institution for youths if all the parties are
residents of that institution.
(c) If the parties agree in advance in a signed record, or a record of
proceeding reflects agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation
is not privileged, the privileges under Sections 4 through 6 do not apply to
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the mediation or part agreed upon. However, Sections 4 through 6 apply to
a mediation communication made by a person that has not received actual
notice of the agreement before the communication is made.
Legislative Note: To the extent that the Act applies to mediations
conducted under the authority of a State's courts, State judiciariesshould
considerenacting conforming court rules.
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REPORTER'S NOTES

1. IN GENERAL.

The Act is broad in its coverage of mediation, a departure from the
common state statutes that apply to mediation in particular contexts, such
as court-connected mediation or community mediation, or to the mediation
of particular types of disputes, such as worker's compensation or civil
rights. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. Section 48-168 (1993) (worker's
compensation); IOWA CODE Section 216.15A (1999) (civil rights).
Moreover, unlike many mediation privileges, it also applies in some
contexts in which the Rules of Evidence are not consistently followed, such
as administrative hearings and arbitration.
Whether the Act in fact applies is a crucial issue because it determines
not only the application of the mediation privilege but also whether the
mediator has the obligations regarding the disclosure of conflicts of interest
and, if asked, qualifications in Section 9; is prohibited from making
disclosures about the mediation to courts, agencies and investigative
authorities in Section 7; and must accommodate requirements regarding
accompanying individuals in Section 10.
Because of the breadth of the Act's coverage, it is important to
delineate its scope with precision. Section 3(a) sets forth three different
mechanisms that trigger the Act's coverage, and will likely cover most
mediation situations that commonly arise. Section 3(b) on the other hand,
carves out a series of narrow and specific exemptions from the Act's
coverage. Finally, Section 3(c) provides a vehicle through which parties
who would be mediating in a context covered by Section 3(a) may "opt
out" of the Act's protections and responsibilities. The central operating
principle throughout this Section is that the Act should support, and guide,
the parties' reasonable expectations about whether the mediations in which
they are participating are included within the scope of the Act.
2. SECTION 3(A). MEDIATIONS COVERED BY ACT; TRIGGERING
MECHANISMS.

Section 3(a) sets forth three conditions, the satisfaction of any one of
which will trigger the application of the Act. This triggering requirement is
necessary because the many different forms, contexts, and practices of
mediation and other methods of dispute resolution make it sometimes
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difficult to know with certainty whether one is engaged in a mediation or
some other dispute resolution or prevention process that employs mediation
and related principles. See, e.g., Ellen J. Waxman & Howard Gadlin,
Ombudsmen: A Buffer Between Institutions, Individuals, 4 DISP. RESOL.
MAg. 21 (Summer 1998) (describing functions of ombuds, which can at
times include mediation concepts and skills); Janice Fleischer & Zena
Zumeta, Group Facilitation:A Way to Address Problems Collaboratively,
4 DIsp. RESOL. MAG.. 4 (Summer 1998) (comparing post-dispute
mediation with pre-dispute facilitation); Lindsay "Peter" White,
Partnering: Agreeing to Work Together on Problems, 4 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 18 (Summer 1998) (describing a common collaborative problem
solving technique used in the construction industry). This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that unlike other professionals - such as doctors,
lawyers, and social workers - mediators are not licensed and the process
they conduct is informal. If the intent to mediate is not clear, even a casual
discussion over a backyard fence might later be deemed to have been a
mediation, unfairly surprising those involved and frustrating the reasonable
expectations of the parties. The first triggering mechanism, Section
3(a)(1), subject to exceptions provided in 3(b), covers those situations in
which mediation parties are either required to mediate or referred to
mediation by governmental institutions or by an arbitrator. Administrative
agencies include those public agencies with the authority to prescribe rules
and regulations to administer a statute, as well as the authority to adjudicate
matters arising under such a statute. They include agricultural departments,
child protective services, civil rights commissions and worker's
compensation boards, to name only a few. Through this triggering
mechanism, the formal court-referred mediation that many people associate
with mediation is clearly covered by the Act.
Where Section 3(a)(1) focuses on publicly referred mediations, the
second triggering mechanism, Section 3(a)(2), furthers party autonomy by
allowing mediation parties and the mediator to trigger the Act by agreeing
to mediate in a record that is signed by the parties and by the mediator. A
later note by one party that they agreed to mediate would not constitute a
record of an agreement to mediate.
In addition, the record must
demonstrate the expectation of the mediation parties and the mediator that
the mediation communications will have a privilege against disclosure.
Yet significantly, these individuals are not required to use any magic
words to obtain the protection of the Act. See Haghighi v. RussianAmerican BroadcastingCo., 577 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. 1998). The lack of a
requirement for magic words tracks the intent to be inclusive and to
embrace the many different approaches to mediation. Moreover, were
magic words required, party and mediator expectations of confidentiality
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under the Act might be frustrated, since a mediation would only be covered
by the Act if the institution remembered to include them in any agreement.
The phrase "privileged against disclosure" clarifies, the type of
expectations that the record must demonstrate tin order to show an
Mere
expectation of confidentiality in a subsequent legal setting.
generalized expectations of confidentiality in a non-legal setting are not
enough to trigger the Act if the case does not fit under Sections 3(a)(1) or
3(a)(3). Take for example a dispute in a university between the heads of
the Spanish and Latin departments that is mediated or "worked out
informally" with the assistance of the head of the French department, at the
suggestion of the university provost. Such a mediation would not
reasonably carry with it party or mediator expectations that the mediation
would be conducted pursuant to an evidentiary privilege, rights of
disclosure and accompaniment and the other protections and obligations of
the Act. Indeed, some of the parties and the mediator may more reasonably
expect that the mediation results, and even the underlying discussions,
would be disclosed to the university provost, and perhaps communicated
throughout the parties' respective departments and elsewhere on campus.
By contrast, however, if the university has a written policy regarding the
mediation of disputes that embraces the Act, and the mediation is
specifically conducted pursuant to that policy, and the parties agree to
participate in mediation in a record signed by the parties, then the parties
would reasonably expect that the Act would apply and conduct themselves
accordingly, both in the mediation and beyond.
The third triggering mechanism, Section 3(a)(3), focuses on
individuals and organizations that provide mediation services and provides
that the Act applies when the mediation is conducted by one who is held
out as a mediator. For example, disputing neighbors who mediate with a
volunteer at a community mediation center would be covered by the Act,
since the center holds itself out as providing mediation services. Similarly,
mediations conducted by a private mediator who advertises his or her
services as a mediator would also be covered, since the private mediator
holds himself or herself out to the public as a mediator. Because the
mediator is publicly held out as a mediator, the parties may reasonably
expect mediations they conduct to be conducted pursuant to relevant law,
specifically the Act. By including those mediations conducted by private
mediators who hold themselves out as mediators, the Act tracks similar
doctrines regarding other professions. In other contexts, "holding out" has
included making a representation in a public manner of being in the
business or having another person make that representation. See 18A AM.
JUR.2d Corporations Section 271 (1985).
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by ombuds practitioners.

See

FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS

OFFICES (August 2001). If such a mediation is conducted pursuant to one

of these triggering mechanisms, such as a written agreement under Section
3(a)(2), it will be protected under the terms of the Act. There is no intent by
the Drafters to exclude or include mediations conducted by an ombuds a
priori. The terms of the Act determine applicability, not a mediator's
formal title.
Finally, on the issue of Section 3(a) inclusions into the Act, the
Drafting Committees discussed whether it should cover the many cultural
and religious practices that are similar to mediation and that use a person
similar to the mediator, as defined in this Act. On the one hand, many of
these cultural and religious practices, like more traditional mediation,
streamline and resolve conflicts, while solving problems and restoring
relationships. Some examples of these practices are Ho'oponopono, circle
ceremonies, family conferencing, and pastoral or marital counseling.
These cultural and religious practices bring richness to the quality of life
and contribute to traditional mediation. On the other hand, there are
instances in which the application of the Act to these practices would be
disruptive of the practices and therefore undesirable.
On balance,
furthering the principle of self-determination, the Drafting Committees
decided that those involved should make the choice to be covered by the
Act in those instances in which other definitional requirements of Section 2
are met by entering into an agreement to mediate reflected by a record or
securing a court or agency referral pursuant to Section 3(a)(1). At the same
time, these persons could opt out the Act's coverage by not using this
triggering mechanism. This leaves a great deal of leeway, appropriately,
with those involved in the practices.
3. SECTION 3(B)(1) AND (2). EXCLUSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
DISPUTES.

Collective bargaining disputes are excluded because of the
longstanding, solidified, and substantially uniform mediation systems that
already are in place in the collective bargaining context. See Memorandum
from ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law of the American Bar
Association to Uniform Mediation Act Reporters 2 (Jan. 23, 2000) (on file
with UMA Drafting Committees); Letter from New York State Bar
Association Labor and Employment Law Section to Reporters, Uniform
Mediation Act 2-4 (Jan. 21, 2000) (on file with UMA Drafting
Committees). This exclusion includes the mediation of disputes arising
under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, as well as mediations
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relating to the formation of a collective bargaining agreement. By contrast,
the exclusion does not include employment discrimination disputes not
arising under the collective bargaining agreement as well as employment
disputes arising after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.
Mediations of disputes in these contexts remain within the protections and
responsibilities of the Act.
4. SECTION 3(B)(3). EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN JUDICIAL CONFERENCES.
Difficult issues arise in mediations that are conducted by judges
during the course of settlement conferences related to pending litigation,
and this Section excludes certain judicially conducted mediations from the
Act. Some have the concern that party autonomy in mediation may be
constrained either by the direct coercion of a judicial officer who may
make a subsequent ruling on the matter, or by the indirect coercive effect
that inherently inures from the parties' knowledge of the ultimate presence
of that judge. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great: Judges
Should Not Mediate Cases Assigned to Them For Trial, 6 DISP. RESOL.

MAG. 11 (Fall 1999), and Frank E.A. Sander, A Friendly Amendment, 6
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 11 (Fall 1999).

This concern is further complicated by the variegated nature of
judicial settlement conferences. As a general matter, judicial settlement
conferences are typically conducted under court or procedural rules that are
similar to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and have come
to include a wide variety of functions, from simple case management to a
venue for court-ordered mediations. See MONT. R. Civ. P., Rule 16(a). In
situations in which a part of the function of judicial conferences is case
management, the parties hardly have an expectation of confidentiality in
the proceedings, even though there may be settlement discussions initiated
or facilitated by the judge or judicial officer. In fact, such hearings
frequently lead to court orders on discovery and issues limitations that are
entered into the public record. In such circumstances, the policy rationales
supporting the confidentiality privilege and other provisions of the Act are
not furthered.
On the other hand, there are judicially-hosted settlement conferences

that for all practical purposes are mediation sessions for which the Act's
policies of promoting full and frank discussions between the parties would
See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Settlement
be furthered.
Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1 (1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement:
Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 485 (1985).
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The Act recognizes the tension created by this wide variety of
settlement functions by drawing a line with regard to those conferences that
are covered by the Act and those that are not covered by the Act. The Act
excludes those settlement conferences in which information from the
mediation is communicated to a judge with responsibility for the case. This
is consistent with the prohibition on mediator reports to courts in Section 7.
The term "judge" in Section 3(b)(3) includes magistrates, special masters,
referees, and any other persons responsible for making rulings or
recommendations on the case. However, the Act does not apply to a court
mediator, or a mediator who contracts or volunteers to mediate cases for a
court because they may not make later rulings on the case. Similarly
mediations conducted by judges specifically and exclusively are assigned
to mediate cases, so-called "buddy judges," and retired judges who return
to mediate cases do not fall within the Section 3(b)(3) exemption because
such mediators do not make later rulings on the case.
Local rules are usually not recognized beyond the court's jurisdiction,
and may not provide assurance of confidentiality if the mediation
communications are sought in another jurisdiction, and if the jurisdiction
does not permit recognize privilege by local rule.
5. SECTION 3(B)(4)(A). EXCLUSION OF PEER MEDIATION.
The Act also exempts mediations between students conducted under
the auspices of school programs because the supervisory needs of schools
toward students, particularly in peer mediation, may not be consistent with
the confidentiality provisions of the Act.
For example, school
administrators need to be able to respond to, and in a proceeding verify,
legitimate threats to student safety or domestic violence that may surface
during a mediation between students. See Memorandum from ABA
Section of Dispute Resolution to Uniform Mediation Act Reporters (Nov.
15, 1999) (on file with UMA Drafting Committees). The law has
"repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority
of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969), citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
This exemption does not include mediations involving a teacher,
parent, or other non-student as such an exemption might preclude coverage
of truancy mediation and other mediation sessions for which the privilege
is pertinent
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6. SECTION 3(3)(4)(B). EXCLUSION OF CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS FOR
YOUTH.

The Act also exempts programs involving youths at correctional
institutions if the mediation parties are all residents of the institution. This
is to facilitate and encourage mediation and conflict prevention and
resolution techniques among those juveniles who have well-documented
and profound needs in those areas. Kristina H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars:
The Legality of IncarceratingJuveniles in Adult Jails, 66 IND. L.J. 999,
1021 (1991). Exempting these programs serves the same policies as are
served by the peer mediation exclusion for non-incarcerated youths. The
Drafters do not intend to exclude cases where at least one party is not a
resident, such as a class action suit against a non-resident in which the
parties mediate or attempt to mediate the case.
7. SECTION 3(C). ALTERNATIVE OF NON-PRIVILEGED MEDIATION.
This Section allows the parties to opt for a non-privileged mediation
or mediation session by mutual agreement, and furthers the Act's policy of
party self-determination. If the parties so agree, the privilege sections of
the Act do not apply, thus fulfilling the parties reasonable expectations
regarding the confidentiality of that mediation or session. For example,
parties in a sophisticated commercial mediation, who are represented by
counsel, may see no need for a privilege to attach to a mediation or session,
and may by express written agreement "opt out" of the Act's privilege
provisions. Similarly, parties may also use this option if they wish to rely
on, and therefore use in evidence, statements made during the mediation. It
is the parties rather than the mediator who make this choice, although a
mediator could presumably refuse to mediate a mediation or session that is
not covered by this Act. Even if the parties do not agree in advance, the
parties, mediator, and all nonparty participants can waive the privilege
pursuant to Section 5. In this instance, however, the mediator and other
participants can block the waiver in some respects.
If the parties want to opt out, they should inform the mediators or
nonparty participants of this agreement, because without actual notice, the
privileges of the Act still apply to the mediation communications of the
persons who have not been so informed until such notice is actually
received. Thus, for example, if a nonparty participant has not received
notice that the opt-out has been invoked, and speaks during a mediation,
that mediation communication is privileged under the Act. If, however,
one of the parties or the mediator tells the nonparty participant that the optout has been invoked, the privilege no longer attaches to statements made
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after the actual notice has been provided, even though the earlier statements
remain privileged because of the lack of notice.
8. OTHER SCOPE ISSUES.
The Act would apply to all mediations that fit the definitions of
mediation by a mediator unless specifically excluded by the State adopting
the Act. For example, a State may want to exclude international
commercial conciliation, which is covered by specific statute in some
States. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. Section 1-567.60 (1991); CAL. CIV.
PRO. Section 1297.401 (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. Section 684.10
(1986).
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SECTION 4. PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE; ADMISSIBILITY;
DISCOVERY

Except as otherwise provided in Section 6, a mediation
(a)
communication is privileged as provided in subsection (b) and is not
subject to discovery or admissible in evidence in a proceeding unless
waived or precluded as provided by Section 5.
(b) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply:
(1) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent
any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication.
A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation
(2)
communication, and may prevent any other person from
disclosing a mediation communication of the mediator.
(3) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may
prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation
communication of the nonparty participant.
(c) Evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to
discovery does not become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely
by reason of its disclosure or use in a mediation.
Legislative Note: The Act does not supersede existing state statutes
that make mediators incompetent to testify, or that providefor costs and
attorneyfees to mediators who are wrongfully subpoenaed. See, e.g., Cal.
Evid. Code Section 703.5 (West 1994).
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REPORTER'S NOTES

1. IN GENERAL.

Sections 4 through 6 set forth the Uniform Mediation Act's general
structure for protecting the confidentiality of mediation communications
against disclosure in later legal proceedings. Section 4 sets forth the
evidentiary privilege, which provides that disclosure of mediation
communications generally cannot be compelled in designated proceedings
or discovery and results in the exclusion of these communications from
evidence and from discovery if requested by any party or, for certain
communications, by a mediator or nonparty participant as well, unless
within an exception delineated in Section 6 applies or the privilege is
waived under the provisions of Section 5. It further delineates the fora in
which the privilege may be asserted. The term "proceeding" is defined in
Section 2(7). The provisions of Sections 4-6 may not be expanded by the
agreement of the parties, but the protections may be waived under Section
5 or under Section 3(c).
2. THE MEDIATION PRIVILEGE STRUCTURE.

a. Rationale ForPrivilege
Section 4(b) grants a privilege for mediation communications that,
like other communications privileges, allows a person to refuse to disclose
and to prevent other people from disclosing particular communications. See
generally Strong, supra, at Section 72; Developments in the Law Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1450 (1985). The Drafters
considered several other approaches to mediation confidentiality including a categorical exclusion for mediation communications, the
extension of evidentiary settlement discussion rules to mediation, and
mediator incompetency.
Upon exhaustive study and consideration,
however, each of these mechanisms proved either overbroad in that they
failed to fairly account for interests of justice that might occasionally
outweigh the importance of mediation confidentiality (categorical
exclusion and mediator incompetency), underbroad in that they failed to
meet the reasonable needs of the mediation process or the reasonable
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expectations of the parties in the mediation process (settlement
discussions), or under-inclusive in that they failed to provide protection for
all of those involved in the mediation process (mediator incompetency).
The Drafters ultimately settled on the use of the privilege structure,
the primary means by which communications are protected at law, an
approach that is narrowly tailored to satisfy the legitimate interests and
expectations of participants in mediation, the mediation process, and the
larger system of justice in which it operates. The privilege structure also
provides greater certainty in judicial interpretation because of the courts'
familiarity with other privileges, and is consistent with the approach taken
by the overwhelming majority of legislatures that have acted to provide
broad legal protections for mediation confidentiality. Indeed, of the 25
States that have enacted confidentiality statutes of general application, 21
have plainly used the privilege structure. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
Section 12-2238 (West 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 16-7-206
(1997); IOWA CODE Section 679C.2 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. Section 60452 (1964); LA. REV. ST. ANN. Section 9:4112 (1997); ME. R. EVID.
Section 408 (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, Section 23C (1985);
MONT. CODE ANN. Section 26-1-813 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT.
Section 48.109(3) (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Section 2317.023 (West
1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, Section 1805 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
Section 36.220 (1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Section 5949 (1996)
(general); R.I. GEN. LAWS Section 9-19-44 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
Section 19-13-32 (1998); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE Section 154.053
(c) (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. Section 30-3-38(4) (2000); VA. CODE ANN.
Section 8.01-576.10 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE Section 5.60.070 (1993);
WIS. STAT. Section 904.085(4)(a) (1997); WYO. STAT. Section 1-43-103
(1991). At least one other has arguably used the privilege structure: See
Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F.Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(treating Cal. Evid. Code Section 703.5 (West 1994) and CAL. EVID. CODE
Section 1119, 1122 (West 1997) as a privilege).
That these privilege statutes also tend to be the more recent of
mediation confidentiality statutory provisions suggests that privilege may
also be seen as the more modem approach taken by state legislatures. See,
e.g., OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. Section 2317.023 (West 1996); FLA. STAT.
ANN. Section 44.102 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. Section 5.60.072
(West 1993); see generally, COLE ET AL., supra, at Section 9:10-9:17.
Moreover, States have been even more consistent in using the privilege
structure for mediation offered by publicly funded entities, such as courtconnected and community mediation programs. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. Section 25-381.16 (West 1977) (domestic court); ARK. CODE.
ANN. Section 11-2-204 (Arkansas Mediation and Conciliation Service)
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(1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. Section 44.201 (publicly established dispute
settlement centers) (West 1998); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. Section20/6
(1987) (non-profit community mediation programs); IND. CODE ANN.
Section 4-6-9-4 (West 1988) (Consumer Protection Division); IOWA CODE
ANN. Section 216.15B (West 1999) (civil rights commission); MINN. STAT.
ANN. Section 176.351 (1987) (workers' compensation bureau); CAL. EVID.
CODE Section 1119, et seq. (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN.
Section 595.02 (1996).
The privilege structure carefully balances the needs of the justice
system against party and mediator needs for confidentiality. For this
reason, legislatures and courts have used the privilege to provide the basis
for protection for other forms of professional communications privileges,
including attorney-client, doctor-patient, and priest-penitent relationships.
See UNIF. R. EVID. R. 510-510 (1986); Strong, supra, at tit. 5. Congress
recently used this structure to provide for confidentiality in the accountantclient context as well. 26 U.S.C. Section 7525 (1998) (Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998). Scholars and practitioners
have joined legislatures in showing strong support for a mediation
privilege. See, e.g., Kirtley, supra; Freedman and Prigoff, supra; Jonathan
M. Hyman, The Model Mediation Confidentiality Rule, 12 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 17 (1988); Eileen Friedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the
Mediation of Minor Disputes, 11 CAP. U. L. REv. 305 (1971); Michael
Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in
Mediation, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (1988). For a critical perspective,
see generally Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege,2
OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 1 (1986); Scott H. Hughes, A Closer Look:
The Casefor a Mediation Privilege Has Not Been Made, 5 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 14 (Winter 1998).
b. Communications To Which The PrivilegeAttaches
The privilege applies to a broad array of "mediation communications"
including some communications that are not made during the course of a
formal mediation session, such as those made for purposes of convening or
continuing a mediation. See Reporter's Notes to Section 2(2) for further
discussion.
c. ProceedingsAt Which The PrivilegeMay Be Asserted
The privilege under Section 4 applies in most legal "proceedings" that
occur during or after a mediation covered by the Act. See Section 2(7). If
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the privilege is raised in a criminal felony proceeding, it is subject to a
specialized treatment under Section 6(b)(1), and the Reporter's Notes to
that Section should be consulted for further clarification.

3.

SECTION 4(A). DESCRIPTION OF EFFECT OF PRIVILEGE.

The words "is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence" in
Section 4(a) make explicit that a court or other tribunal must exclude
privileged communications that are protected under these sections, and may
not compel discovery of them. Because the privilege is unfamiliar to many
using mediation, this Section provides a description of the effect of the
privilege provided in Sections 4(b), 5, and 6. It does not change the reach
of the remainder of the Section.
4. SECTION 4(B). OPERATION OF PRIVILEGE.
As with other privileges, a mediation privilege operates to allow a
person to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing
particular communications. See generally Strong, supra, at Section 72;
Developments in the Law - PrivilegedCommunications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450 (1985).
This blocking function is critical to the operation of the privilege. As
discussed in more detail below, parties have the greatest blocking power
and may block provision of testimony about or other evidence of mediation
communications made by anyone in the mediation, including persons other
than the mediator and parties. The evidence may be blocked whether the
testimony is by another party, a mediator, or any other participant.
However, if all parties agree that a party should testify about a party's
mediation communications, no one else may block them from doing so,
including a mediator or nonparty participant.
Mediators may block their own provision of evidence, including their
own testimony and evidence provided by anyone else of the mediator's
mediation communications, even if the parties consent. Nonetheless, the
parties' consent is required to admit the mediator's provision of evidence,
as well as evidence provided by another regarding the mediator's mediation
communications.
Finally, a nonparty participant may block evidence of that individual's
mediation communication regardless of who provides the evidence and
whether the parties or mediator consent. Once again, nonetheless, the
nonparty participant may not provide such evidence if the parties do not
consent. This is consistent with fixing the limits of the privilege to protect
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the expectations of those persons whose candor is most important to the
success of the mediation process.
a. The Holders Of The Privilege

1. In General
A critical component of the Act's general rule is its designation of the
holder - i.e., the person who is eligible to raise and waive the privilege.
This designation brings both clarity and uniformity to the law.
Statutory mediation privileges are somewhat unusual among evidentiary
privileges in that they often do not specify who may hold and/or waive the
privilege, leaving that to judicial interpretation. See, e.g., 710 ILL. COMP.
STAT. Section 20/6 (1987) (community dispute resolution centers); IND.
CODE Section 20-7.5-1-13 (1987) (university employee unions); IOWA
CODE Section 679.12 (1985) (general); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
Section 336.153 (1988) (labor disputes); 26 ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
Section 1026 (1999) (university employee unions); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
150, Section 10A (1985) (labor disputes).
Those statutes that designate a holder tend to be split between those
that make the parties the only holders of the privilege, and those that also
make the mediator a holder. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. Section 11-2-204
(1979) (labor disputes); FLA. STAT. ANN. Section 61.183 (1996) (divorce);
KAN. STAT. ANN. Section 23-605 (1999) (domestic disputes); N.C. GEN.
STAT. Section 41A-7(d) (1998) (fair housing); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
Section 107.785 (1995) (divorce) (providing that the parties are the sole
holders) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Section 2317.023 (West 1996)
(general); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. Section 7.75.050 (1984) (dispute
resolution centers (making the mediator an additional holder in some
respects).
The Act adopts an approach that provides that both the parties and the
mediators may assert the privilege regarding certain matters, thus giving
weight to the primary concern of each rationale. See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. Section 2317.023 (West 1996) (general); WASH. REV. CODE
Section 5.60.070 (1993) (general). In addition, the Act provides a limited
privilege for nonparty participants, as discussed in Section (c) below.
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2. PartiesAs Holders
The mediation privilege of the parties draws upon the purpose,
rationale, and traditions of the attorney-client privilege, in that its
paramount justification is to encourage candor by the mediation parties,
just as encouraging the client's candor is the central justification for the
attorney-client privilege. See PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE

IN THE UNITED STATES 2.1-2.3 (2d ed. 1999).
The analysis for the parties as holders appears quite different at first
examination from traditional communications privileges because
mediations involve parties whose interests appear to be adverse. However,
the law of attorney-client privilege has considerable experience with
situations in which multiple-client interests may conflict, and those
experiences support the analogy of the mediation privilege to the attorneyclient privilege. For example, the attorney-client privilege has been
recognized in the context of a joint defense in which interests of the clients
may conflict in part and yet one may prevent later disclosure by another.
See Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App.3d 683, 256 Cal. Rptr.
425 (1989); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979); Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., PLC,
508 So.2d 437 (Fla. App. 1987); but see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuller, 695
S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App. 1985) (refusing to apply the joint defense doctrine
to parties who were not directly adverse); see generally Patricia Welles, A
Survey of Attorney-Client Privilege in Joint Defense, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV.
321 (1981). Similarly, the attorney-client privilege applies in the insurance
context, in which an insurer generally has the right to control the defense of
an action brought against the insured, when the insurer may be liable for
some or all of the liability associated with an adverse verdict.
Desriusseaux v. Val-Roc Truck Corp., 230 A.D.2d 704 (N.Y. Supreme Ct.
1996); PAUL R. RCE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED
STATES, 4:30-4:38 (2d ed. 1999).
It should be noted that even if the mediator loses the privilege to block
or assert a privilege, the parties may still come forward and assert their
privilege, thus blocking the mediator who has lost the privilege from
providing testimony about the affected mediation. This Section should be
read in conjunction with 9(d) below.
3. MediatorAs Holders
Mediators are made holders with respect to their own mediation
communications, so that they may participate candidly, and with respect to
their own testimony, so that they will not be viewed as biased in future
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mediations, as discussed further in the Reporter's Prefatory Note. As noted
above in Section 4(a)(2) above and in commentary to Section 9(d) below,
even if the mediator loses the privilege to block or assert a privilege, the
parties may still come forward and assert their privilege.
4. Nonparty ParticipantsAs Holders
In addition, the Act adds a privilege for the nonparty participant,
though limited to the communications by that individual in the mediation.
See 5 U.S.C. Section 574(a)(1). The purpose is to encourage the candid
participation of experts and others who may have information that would
facilitate resolution of the case. This would also cover statements prepared
by such persons for the mediation and submitted as part of it, such as
experts' reports. Any party who expects to use such an expert report
prepared to submit in mediation later in a legal proceeding would have to
secure permission of all parties and the expert in order to do so. This is
consistent with the treatment of reports prepared for mediation as
mediation communications. See Section 2(2).
5. ContractualNotice Of Intent To Invoke The Mediation Privilege
As a practical matter, a person who holds a mediation privilege can
only assert the privilege if that person knows that evidence of a mediation
communication will be sought or offered at a proceeding. This presents no
problem in the usual case in which the subsequent proceeding arises
because of the failure of the mediation to resolve the dispute because the
mediation party would be one of the parties to the proceeding in which the
mediation communications are being sought. To guard against the unusual
situation in which a party or mediator may wish to assert the privilege, but
is unaware of the necessity, the parties and mediator may wish to contract
for notification of the possible use of mediation information, as is a practice
under the attomey-client privilege for joint defense consultation. See PAUL
R. RICE, ET. AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
SECTION 18-25 (2d ed. 1999) (attorney client privilege in context of joint
representation).
5. SECTION 4(C). OTHERWISE DISCOVERABLE EVIDENCE.

This provision acknowledges the importance of the availability of
relevant evidence to the truth-seeking function of courts and administrative
agencies, and makes clear that relevant evidence may not be shielded from
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discovery or admission at trial merely because it is communicated in a
For purposes of the mediation privilege, it is the
mediation.
communication that is made in a mediation that is protected by the
privilege, not the underlying evidence giving rise to the communication.
Evidence that is communicated in a mediation is subject to discovery, just
as it would be if the mediation had not taken place.
There is no "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in the mediation
privilege. For example, a party who learns about a witness during a
mediation is not precluded by the privilege from subpoenaing that witness.
This is a common exemption in mediation privilege statutes, and is also
found in Uniform Rule of Evidence 408. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
Section 44.102 (1999) (general); MINN. STAT. ANN. Section 595.02 (1996)
(general); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Section 2317.023 (West 1996) (general);
WASH. REV. CODE Section 5.60.070 (1993) (general).
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SECTION 5. WAIVER AND PRECLUSION OF PRIVILEGE

(a) A privilege under Section 4 may be waived in a record or orally
during a proceeding if it is expressly waived by all parties to the mediation
and:
(1) in the case of the privilege of a mediator, it is expressly
waived by the mediator; and
(2) in the case of the privilege of a nonparty participant, it is
expressly waived by the nonparty participant.
(b) A person that discloses or makes a representation about a
mediation communication which prejudices another person in a proceeding
is precluded from asserting a privilege under Section 4, but only to the
extent necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the representation
or disclosure.
(c) A person that intentionally uses a mediation to plan, attempt to
commit or commit a crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing
criminal activity is precluded from asserting a privilege under Section 4.
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REPORTER'S NOTES

1. SECTION 5(A) AND (B). WAIVER AND PRECLUSION.

Section 5 provides for waiver of privilege, and for a party, mediator,
or nonparty participant to be precluded from asserting the privilege in
situations in which mediation communications have been disclosed before
the privilege has been asserted. Waiver must be express and either
recorded through a writing or electronic record or made orally during
specified types of proceedings. These rules further the principle of party
autonomy in that mediation participants may generally prefer not to waive
their mediation privilege rights. However, there may be situations in which
one or more parties may wish to be freed from the burden of privilege, and
the waiver provision permits that possibility. See, e.g., Olam v. Congress
Mortgage Co., 68 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1131-33 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
Significantly, these provisions differ from the attorney-client privilege
in that the mediation privilege does not permit waiver to be implied by
conduct. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE
Section 511.1 (4th ed. 1996). The rationale for requiring explicit waiver is
to safeguard against the possibility of inadvertent waiver, such as through
the often salutary practice of parties discussing their dispute and mediation
with friends and relatives. In contrast to these settings, there is a sense of
formality and awareness of legal rights in all of the proceedings to which
the privilege may be waived if the waiver is oral. They generally are
conducted on the record, easing the difficulties of establishing what was
said.
Read together with Section 4, the waiver operates as follows:
• For testimony about mediation communications made by
a party, all parties are the holders and therefore all parties
must waive the privilege before a party or nonparty
participant may testify or provide evidence; if that
testimony is to be provided by a mediator, all parties and
the mediator must waive the privilege.
. For .testimony about mediation communications that are
made by the mediator, both the parties and the mediator are
holders of the privilege, and therefore both the parties and
the mediator must waive the privilege before a party,
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mediator, or nonparty participant may testify or provide
evidence of a mediator's mediation communications.
For testimony about mediation communications that are
made by a nonparty participant, both the parties and the
nonparty participants are holders of the privilege and
therefore both the parties and the nonparty participant must
waive before a party or nonparty participant may testify; if
that testimony is to be offered through the mediator, the
mediator must also waive.
Earlier drafts included provisions that permitted waiver by conduct,
However, the
which is common among communications privileges.
Drafting Committees deleted those provisions because of concerns that
mediators and parties unfamiliar with the statutory environment might
waive their privilege rights inadvertently. That created the anomalous
situation of permitting the opportunity for one party to blurt out potentially
damaging information in the midst of a trial and then use the privilege to
block the other party from contesting the truth.
To address this anomaly, the Drafters added Section 5(b), a preclusion
provision to cover situations in which the parties do not expressly waive
the privilege but engage in conduct inconsistent with the assertions of the
privilege, and that cause prejudice. As under existing interpretations for
other communications privileges, waiver through preclusion would not
typically constitute a waiver with respect to all mediation communications,
only those related in subject matter. See generally UNIF. R. EVID. R. 510
and 511 (1986).
Critically, the preclusion provision applies only if the disclosure
prejudices another in a proceeding. It is not intended to encompass the
casual recounting of the mediation session to a neighbor that is not
admissible in court, but would include disclosure that would, absent the
exception, allow one party to take unfair advantage of the privilege. For
example, if one party's attorney states in court that the other party admitted
destroying evidence during mediation, that party should not be able to
block the use of testimony to refute that statement later in that proceeding.
Such advantage-taking or opportunism would be inconsistent with the
policy rationales that support continued recognition of the privilege, while
the casual conversation would not. Thus, if Andy and Betty were the
parties in a mediation, and Andy affirmatively stated in court that Betty
admitted destroying evidence during the mediation, Andy is precluded
from asserting that A did not waive the privilege. If Betty decides to waive
as well, evidence of Andy's and Betty's statements during mediation may
be admitted.
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Analogous doctrines have developed regarding constitutional
privileges, Harrisv. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (shield provided
by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a
defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances), and the rule of completeness in Rule 106 of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, which states that if one party introduces part of a record, an
adverse party may introduce other parts when to do otherwise would be
unfair.
Finally, it is worth noting that in arbitration, which is sometimes
conducted without an ongoing record, it will be important for waiving
parties to ask the arbitrator to note the waiver. Any individual who wants
notice that another has received a subpoena for mediation communications
or has waived the privilege can provide for notification as a clause in the
agreement to mediate or the mediated agreement.
2. SECTION 5(C). PRECLUSION FOR USE OF MEDIATION TO PLAN OR
COMMIT CRIME.

This preclusion reflects a common practice in the States of exempting
from confidentiality protection those mediation communications that relate
to the ongoing or future commission of a crime, as discussed in the
Reporter's Notes to Section 6(a)(4). However, it narrows the preclusion,
thus retaining broader confidentiality, and removes the privilege protection
only when an actor uses or attempts to use the mediation itself to further
the commission of a crime, rather than lifting the confidentiality protection
more broadly to any discussion of crimes. For example, it would preclude
gang members from claiming that a meeting to plan a drug deal was really
a mediation that would privilege those communications in a later criminal
or civil case.
This Section should be read together with Section 6(a)(4), which
applies to particular communications within a mediation which are used for
the same purposes. The two differ on the purpose of the mediation: Section
5(c) applies when the mediation itself is used to further a crime, while
Section 6(a)(4) applies to matters that are being mediated for other
purposes but which include discussion of acts or statements that may be
deemed criminal in nature. Under Section 5(c), the preclusion applies to all
mediation communications because the purpose of the mediation frustrates
public policy. Under Section 6(a)(4), the preclusion only applies to those
mediation communications that have a criminal character; the privilege
may still be asserted to block the introduction of other communications
made during the mediation. This rationale is discussed more fully in the
Comments to Section 6(a)(4).
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6. EXCEPTIONS To PRIVILEGE

(a)
There is no privilege under Section 4 for a mediation
communication that is:
(1) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to
the agreement;
(2) available to the public under [insert statutory reference to
open records act] or made during a session of a mediation which
is open, or is required by law to be open, to the public;
(3) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or
commit a crime of violence;
(4) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or
commit a crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing
criminal activity;
(5) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of
professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator;
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), sought or
offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional
misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediation party,
nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on
conduct occurring during a mediation; or
(7) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or exploitation in a proceeding in which a child or
adult protective services agency is a party, unless the
[Alternative A: [State to insert, for example, child or adult
protection] case is referred by a court to mediation and a
public agency participates.]
[Alternative B: public agency participates in the [State to
insert, for example, child or adult protection] mediation].
(b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative
agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking
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discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is
not otherwise available, that there is a need for the evidence that
substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that
the mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(1) a court proceeding involving a felony [or misdemeanor]; or
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding
to prove a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid
liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a
mediation communication referred to in subsection (a)(6) or (b)(2).
(d) If a mediation communication is not privileged under subsection
(a) or (b), only the portion of the communication necessary for the
application of the exception from nondisclosure may be admitted.
Admission of evidence under subsection (a) or (b) does not render the
evidence, or any other mediation communication, discoverable or
admissible for any other purpose.
Legislative Note: If the enacting state does not have an open records
act, the following language in paragraph(2) of subsection (a) needs to be
deleted. "availableto the public under [insert statutory reference to open
recordsact] or".
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REPORTER'S NOTES

1. IN GENERAL.

This Section articulates specific and exclusive exceptions to the broad
grant of privilege provided to mediation communications in Section 4. As
with other privileges, when it is necessary to consider evidence in order to
determine if an exception applies, the Act contemplates that a court will
hold an in camera proceeding at which the claim for exemption from the
privilege can be confidentially asserted and defended. See, e.g., Rinaker v.
Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 464, 466 (Ct. App. 1998); Olam v.
Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1131-33 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(discussing whether an in camera hearing is necessary).
The exceptions in Section 6(a) apply regardless of the need for the
evidence because society's interest in the information contained in the
mediation communications may be said to categorically outweigh its
interest in the confidentiality of mediation communications. In contrast,
the exceptions under Section 6(b) would apply only in situations where the
relative strengths of society's interest in a mediation communication and
mediation participant interest in confidentiality can only be measured under
the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In these situations, the
Act establishes what is in effect a presumption of privilege, which may be
rebutted in an off-the-record hearing in which the proponent of the
evidence must meet a high standard of need by demonstrating that the
evidence is otherwise unavailable and that the need for it in the case at bar
substantially outweighs the state's interest in protecting the confidentiality
of mediation. In other words, the exceptions listed in 6(b) include
situations that should remain confidential but for overriding concerns for
justice.

2. SECTION 6(A)(1). RECORD OF AN AGREEMENT.
This exception would permit evidence of a signed agreement, such as
an agreement to mediate, an agreement regarding how the mediation should
be conducted -- including whether the parties and mediator may disclose
outside of proceedings, or, more commonly, written agreements
memorializing the parties' resolution of the dispute. The exception permits
such an agreement to be introduced in a subsequent court proceeding
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convened to determine whether the terms of that settlement agreement had
been breached.
The words "agreement evidenced by a record" and "signed" refer to
written and executed agreements, those recorded by tape recorded and
ascribed to by the parties on the tape, and other electronic means to record
and sign, as defined in Sections 2(9) and 2(10). In other words, a
participant's notes about an oral agreement would not be a signed
On the other hand, the following situations would be
agreement.
considered a signed agreement: a handwritten agreement that the parties
have signed, an e-mail exchange between the parties in which they agree to
particular provisions, and a tape recording in which they state what
constitutes their agreement.
Written agreements are commonly excepted from mediation
confidentiality protections, permitting the Act to embrace current practices
in a majority of States. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 12-2238
(1993); CAL. EVID. CODE Section 1120(1) (West 1997) (general); CAL.
EVID. CODE Section 1123 (West 1997) (general); CAL. GOV'T. CODE
Section 12980(i) (West 1998) (housing discrimination); COLO. REV. STAT.
Section 24-34-506.5 (1993) (housing discrimination); GA. CODE ANN.
Section 45-19-36(e) (1989) (fair employment); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.
Section 5/7B-102(E)(3) (1989) (human rights); IND. CODE Section 679.2
(1998) (general); IOWA. CODE ANN. Section 216.15(B) (1999) (civil
rights); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 344.200(4) (1996) (civil rights); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. Section 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (1997) (general); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. Section 51:2257(D) (1998) (human rights); 5 ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. Section 4612(1)(A) (1995) (human rights); MD. CODE 1957 ANN.
ART. 49(B) Section 28 (1991) (human rights); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch.
151B, Section 5 (1991) (job discrimination); MO. REV. STAT.
Section 213.077 (1992) (human rights); NEB. REV. STAT. Section 43-2908
(1993) (parenting act); N.J. STAT. ANN. Section 10:5-14 (1992) (civil
rights); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 36.220(2)(a) (1997) (general); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. 36.262 (1989) (agricultural foreclosure); 42 PA. CONSOL.
STAT. Section 5949(b)(1) (1996) (general); TENN. CODE ANN. Section 4(human rights); TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN.
21-303(d) (1996)
Section 2008.057 (1999) (Administrative Procedure Act); VT. R. CIV. P.,
Rule 16.3 (1998) (general civil); VA. CODE ANN. Section 8.01-576.10
(1994) (general); VA. CODE ANN. Section 8.01-581.22 (1988) (general);
WASH. REV. CODE Section 5.60.070 (1)(e) and (f) (1993) ( 1993)
(general); WASH. REV. Code Section 26.09.015(3) (1991) (divorce);
WASH. REV. CODE Section 49.60.240 (1995) (human rights); W.VA. CODE
Section 5-11 A- I1(b)(4) (1992) (fair housing); W.VA. CODE Section 6B-2-
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4(r) (1990) (public employees); WIS. STAT. Section 767.11(12) (1993)
(family court); WiS. STAT. Section 904.085(4)(a) (1997) (general).
This exception is noteworthy only for what is not included: oral
agreements. The disadvantage of exempting oral settlements is that nearly
everything said during a mediation session could bear on either whether the
parties came to an agreement or the content of the agreement. In other
words, an exception for oral agreements has the potential to swallow the
rule of privilege. As a result, mediation participants might be less candid,
not knowing whether a controversy later would erupt over an oral
agreement. Unfortunately, excluding evidence of oral settlements reached
during a mediation session would operate to the disadvantage of a less
legally sophisticated party who is accustomed to the enforcement of oral
settlements reached in negotiations. Such a person might also mistakenly
assume the admissibility of evidence of oral settlements reached in
mediation as well. However, because the majority of courts and statutes
limit the confidentiality exception to signed written agreements, one would
expect that mediators and others will soon incorporate knowledge of a
writing requirement into their practices. See Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d
805 (Ind., 2000) (citing draft Uniform Mediation Act); Ryan v. Garcia,27
Cal. App. 4th 1006, 1012 (1994) (privilege statute precluded evidence of
oral agreement); Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla. App. 1992)
(privilege statute precluded evidence of oral settlement); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. Section 2317.023 (West 1996). For an example of a state statute
permitting the enforcement of oral agreements under certain narrow
circumstances, see CAL. EVID. CODE Section 1118, 1124 (West 1997)
(providing that oral agreement must be memorialized in writing within 72
hours).
Despite the limitation on oral agreements, the Act leaves parties other
means to preserve the agreement quickly. For example, parties can agree
that the mediation has ended, state their oral agreement into the tape
recorder and record their assent. See Regents of the University of
California v. Sumner, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1209, 1212 (1996). This approach
was codified in CAL. EvID. CODE Section 1118, 1124 (West 1997).
The parties may still provide that particular settlements agreements
are confidential with regard to disclosure to the general public, and provide
for sanctions for the party who discloses voluntarily. See Stephen A.
Hochman, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Trap for the Unwary, SB41
ALI-ABA 605 (1995). However, confidentiality agreements reached in
mediation, like those in other settlement situations, are subject to the need
for evidence and public policy considerations. See COLE ET AL., supra,
Section 9.23, 9.25.
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3. SECTION 6(A)(2). MEDIATIONS OPEN TO THE PUBLIC; MEETINGS AND
RECORDS MADE OPEN BY LAW.

Section 6(a)(2) makes clear that the privileges in Section 4 do not
preempt state open meetings and open records laws, thus deferring to the
policies of the individual States regarding the types of meetings that will be
subject to these laws. In addition, it provides an exception when the
mediation is opened to the public, such as a televised mediation.
This exception recognizes that there should be no after-the-fact
confidentiality for communications that were made in a meeting that was
either voluntarily open to the public - such as a workgroup meeting in a
federal negotiated rule making that was made open to the general public,
even though not required by Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) to
be open - or was required to be open to the public pursuant to an open
meeting law. For example, the Act would provide no privilege if an agency
holds a closed meeting but FACA would require that it be open. This
exception also applies if a meeting was properly closed but an open record
law requires that the meeting summaries or other documents - perhaps
even a transcript - be made available under certain circumstances, e.g. the
Federal Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. 552b (1995). In this situation, only the
records would be excepted from the privilege, however.
4. SECTION 6(A)(3). THREATS OF BODILY INJURY OR TO COMMIT A CRIME
OF VIOLENCE.

The policy rationales supporting the privilege do not support
mediation communications that threaten bodily injury or crimes of
violence. To the contrary, in cases in which a credible threat has been
made disclosure would serve the public interest in safety and the protection
of others. Because such statements are sometimes made in anger with no
intention to commit the act, the exception is a narrow one that applies only
to the threatening statements; the remainder of the mediation
communication remains protected against disclosure.
State mediation confidentiality statutes frequently recognize a similar
exception. See ALASKA STAT. Section 47.12.450(e) (1998) (community
dispute resolution centers) (admissible to extent relevant to a criminal
matter); COLO. REV. STAT. Section 13-22-307 (1998) (general) (bodily
injury); KAN. STAT. ANN. Section 23-605(b)(5) (1999) (domestic relations)
(mediator may report threats of violence to court); OR. REV. STAT.

Section 36.220(6) (1997) (general) (substantial bodily injury to specific

person); 42 PA. CONS. ST. ANN. Section 5949(2)(I) (1996) (general)
(threats of bodily injury); WASH. REV. CODE Section 7.75.050 (1984)
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(community dispute resolution centers) (threats of bodily injury); WYO.
STAT. Section 1-43-103 (c)(ii) (1991) (general) (future crime or harmful
act).
5. SECTION 6(A)(4). COMMUNICATIONS USED TO PLAN OR COMMIT A

CRIME.

The policies underlying this provision mirror those underlying Section
5(c), and are discussed there.
This exception applies to particular
communications used to plan or commit a crime, whereas Section 5(c)
applies when the mediation is used for these purposes. It includes
communication intentionally used to conceal an ongoing crime or criminal
activity.
Almost a dozen States currently have mediation confidentiality
protections that contain exceptions related to a commission of a crime.
COLO. REV STAT. Section 13-22-307 (1991) (general) (future felony); FLA.
STAT. ANN. Section 723.038 (mobile home parks) (ongoing or future crime
or fraud); IOWA CODE Section 216.15B (1999) (civil rights); IOWA CODE
Section 654A.13 (1990) (farmer-lender); IOWA CODE Section 679C.2
(1998) (general) (ongoing or future crimes); KAN. STAT. ANN. Section 23605(b)(3) (1989) (ongoing and future crime or fraud); KAN. STAT. ANN.
Section 44-817(c)(3) (1996) (labor) (ongoing and future crime or fraud);
KAN. STAT. ANN. Section 75-4332(d)(3) (1996) (public employment)
(ongoing and future crime or fraud); 24 ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
Section 2857(2) (1999) (health care) (to prove fraud during mediation);
MINN. STAT. Section 595.02(1)(a) (1996) (general); NEB. REV. STAT.
Section 25-2914 (1994) (general) (crime or fraud); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
Section 328-C:9(III) (1998) (domestic relations) (perjury in mediation);
N.J. STAT ANN. Section 34:13A-16(h) (1997) (workers' compensation)
(any crime); N.Y. LAB. LAWS Section 702-a(5) (McKinney 1991) (past
crimes) (labor mediation); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 36.220(6) (1997)
(general) (future bodily harm to a specific person); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
Section 19-13-32 (1998) (general) (crime or fraud); WYo. STAT. ANN.
Section 1-43-103(c)(ii) (1991) (future crime).
While ready to exempt attempts to commit or the commission of
crimes from confidentiality protection, the Drafting Committees declined to
cover "fraud" that would not also constitute a crime because civil cases
frequently include allegations of fraud, with varying degrees of merit, and
the mediation would appropriately focus on discussion of fraud claims.
Some state statutes do exempt fraud, although less frequently than they do
crime. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. Section 723.038(8) (1994) (mobile
home parks) (communications made in furtherance of commission of crime
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or fraud); KAN. STAT. ANN. Section 23-605(b)(3) (1999) (domestic
relations) (ongoing crime or fraud); KAN. STAT. ANN. Section 44-817(c)(3)
(1996) (labor) (ongoing crime or fraud); KAN. STAT. ANN. Section 60452(b)(3) (1964) (general) (ongoing or future crime or fraud); KAN. STAT.
ANN. Section 75-4332(d)(3) (1996) (public employment) (ongoing or
future crime or fraud); NEB. REV. STAT. Section 25-2914 (1994) (general)
(crime or fraud); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS Section 19-13-32 (1998) (general)
(crime or fraud).
cover mediation
not
does
exception
this
Significantly,
or past potential
crimes,
of
past
admissions
communications constituting
of past
discussions
crimes, which remain privileged. Thus, for example,
aggressive positions with regard to taxation or other matters of regulatory
compliance in commercial mediations remain privileged against possible
The Drafting
use in subsequent or simultaneous civil proceedings.
for the
exception
an
of
creating
possibility
the
discussed
Committees
conduct
of
past
admission
an
related circumstance in which a party makes
that portends future bad conduct. However, they decided against such an
expansion of this exception because such past conduct can already be
disclosed in other important ways. The other parties can warn others,
because parties are not prohibited from disclosing by the Act. The Act
permits the mediator to disclose if required by law to disclose felonies or if
public policy requires.
It is important to emphasize that the Act's limited focus as an
evidentiary and discovery privilege, rather than a broader rule of
confidentiality means that this privilege provision would not prevent a
party from calling the police, or warning someone in danger.
Finally, it should be noted that this exception is intended to prevent
the abuse of the privilege as a shield to evidence that might be necessary to
prosecute or defend a crime. The Drafters recognize that it is possible that
the exception itself could be abused. Such unethical or bad faith conduct
would continue to be subject to traditional sanction standards.
6. SECTION 6(A)(5). EVIDENCE OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT OR
MALPRACTICE BY THE MEDIATOR.

The rationale behind the exception is that disclosures may be
necessary to promote accountability of mediators by allowing for
grievances to be brought against mediators, and as a matter of fundamental
fairness, to permit the mediator to defend against such a claim. Moreover,
permitting complaints against the mediator furthers the central rationale
that States have used to reject the traditional basis of licensure and
credentialing for assuring quality in professional practice: that private
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actions will serve an adequate regulatory function and sift out incompetent
or unethical providers through liability and the rejection of service. See,
e.g., W. Lee Dobbins, The Debate Over MediatorQualifications: Can They
Satisfy the Growing Need to Measure Competence Without BarringEntry
into the Market?, U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 96-98 (1995).
7. SECTION 6(A)(6). EVIDENCE OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT OR
MALPRACTICE BY A PARTY OR REPRESENTATIVE OF A PARTY.
Sometimes the issue arises whether anyone may provide evidence of
professional misconduct or malpractice occurring during the mediation.
See In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780 (D.C. App. 1990); see generally Pamela
Kentra, HearNo Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict
for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation
Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997
B.Y.U. L. REV. 715, 740-75 1. The failure to provide an exception for such
evidence would mean that lawyers and fiduciaries could act unethically or
in violation of standards without concern that evidence of the misconduct
would later be admissible in a proceeding brought for recourse. This
exception makes it possible to use testimony of anyone except the mediator
in proceedings at which such a claim is made or defended. Because of the
potential adverse impact on a mediator's appearance of impartiality, the use
of mediator testimony is more guarded, and therefore protected by Section
6(c). It is important to note that evidence fitting this exception would still
be protected in other types of proceedings, such as those related to the
dispute being mediated.
Reporting requirements operate independently of the privilege and this
exception. Mediators and other are not precluded by the Act from
reporting misconduct to an agency or tribunal other than one that might
make a ruling on the dispute being mediated, which is precluded by Section
8(a) and (b).
8. SECTION 6(A)(7). EVIDENCE OF ABUSE OR NEGLECT.
An exception for child abuse and neglect is common in domestic
mediation confidentiality statutes, and the Act reaffirms these important
policy choices States have made to protect their citizens. See, e.g., IOWA.
CODE ANN. Section 679c.3(4) (1998) (general); KAN. STAT. ANN.
Section 23-605(b)(2) (1999) (domestic relations); KAN. STAT. ANN.
Section 38-1522(a) (1997) (general); KAN. STAT. ANN. Section44817(c)(2) (1996) (labor); KAN. STAT. ANN. Section 72-5427(e)(2) (1996)
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(teachers); KAN. STAT. ANN. Section 75-4332(d)(1) (1996) (public
employment); MINN. STAT. ANN. Section 595.02(2)(a)(5) (1996) (general);
MONT. CODE ANN. Section 41-3-404 (1999) (child abuse investigations)
(mediator may not be compelled to testify); NEB. REV. STAT. Section 432908 (1993) (parenting act) (in camera); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
Section 328-C:9(III)(c ) (1998) (marital); N.C. GEN. STAT. Section 7A38.1(L) (1999) (superior court); N.C. GEN. STAT. Section 7A-38.4(K)
(1999) (district courts); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Section 3109.052(c) (West
1990) (child custody); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Section 5123.601 (West
1988) (mental retardation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Section 2317.02 (1998)
(general); OR. REV. STAT. Section 36.220(5) (1997) (general); TENN.
CODE ANN. Section 36-4-130(b)(5) (1993) (divorce); UTAH CODE ANN.
Section 30-3-38(4) (2000) (divorce) (mediator shall report); VA. CODE
WIS. STAT.
(2000) (welfare);
Section 63.1-248.3(A)(10)
ANN.
STAT.
WIS.
services):
(social
(1997)
Section 48.981(2)
Section 904.085(4)(d) (1997) (general); WYO. STAT. Section 1-43103(c)(iii) (1991) (general). But see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 8807(B) (West 1998) (child abuse investigations) (rejecting rule of
disclosure).
By referring to "child and adult protective services agency," the
exception broadens the coverage to include the elderly and disabled if that
State has protected them by statute and has created an agency enforcement
process. It should be stressed that this exception. applies only to permit
disclosures in public agency proceedings in which the agency is a party or
nonparty participant. The exception does not apply in private actions, such
as divorce, because the need for the evidence is not as great as in
proceedings brought to protect against abuse and neglect so that the harm
can be stopped, and is outweighed by the policy of promoting candor
during mediation. For example, in a mediation between Husband and Wife
who are seeking a divorce, Husband admits to sexually abusing a child.
Husband's admission would not be privileged in an action brought by the
public agency to protect the child, but would be privileged in the divorce
hearings.
The last bracketed phrases make an exception to the exception to
privilege of mediation communications in certain mediations involving
such public agencies. Child protection agencies in many States have
created mediation programs to resolve issues that arise because of
allegations of abuse. Those advocating the use of mediation in these
contexts point to the need for privilege to promote the use of the process,
and these alternatives provide it. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND

FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING THE CHILD
These alternatives are
ABUSE AND NEGLECT COURT PROCESS (1995).
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bracketed and offered to the states as recommended model provisions
because of concerns raised by some mediators of such cases that mediator
testimony sometimes can be necessary and appropriate to secure the safety
of a vulnerable party in a situation of abuse. See Letter from American Bar
Association Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law,
November 15, 2000 (on file with Drafting Committees).
The words "child or adult protection" are bracketed so that States
using a different term or encouraging mediation of disputes arising from
abuse of other protected classes can add appropriate language.
Each state may chose to enact either Alternative A or Alternative B.
The Alternative A exception only applies to cases referred by the court or
public agency. In this situation, allegations already have been made in an
official context and a court has made the determination that settlement of
that case is in the public interest by referring it to mediation. In Alternative
B exception, no court referral is required. A state enacting Alternative B
would be adopting a policy that it is sufficient that the public agency favors
settlement of a particular case by its participation in the mediation.
The term "public agency" may have to be modified in a State in which
a private agency is charged by law to assume the duties to protect children
in these contexts.
9. SECTION 6(B). EXCEPTIONS REQUIRING DEMONSTRATION OF NEED.

The exceptions under this Section constitute less common fact
patterns that may sometimes justify carving an exception, but only when
the unique facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate that the
evidence is otherwise unavailable, and the need for the evidence outweighs
the policies underlying the privilege. Thus, Section 6(b) effectively places
the burden on the proponent to persuade the court on these points. The
evidence will not be disclosed absent a finding on these points after an in
camera hearing. Further, under Section 6(d) the evidence will be admitted
only for that limited purpose.
10. SECTION 6(B)(1). FELONY [AND MISDEMEANORS].

As noted in the commentary to Section 6, point 5, the Act affords
more specialized treatment for the use of mediation communications in
subsequent felony proceedings, which reflects the unique character,
considerations, and concerns that attend the need for evidence in the
criminal process. States may also wish to extend this specialized treatment
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to misdemeanors, and the Drafters offer appropriate model language for
states in that event.
Existing privilege statutes are silent or split as to whether they apply
only to civil proceedings, apply also to some juvenile or misdemeanor
proceedings, or apply as well to all criminal proceedings. The split among
the States reflects clashing policy interests. One the one hand, mediation
participants operating under the benefit of a privilege might reasonably
expect that statements made in mediation would not be available for use in
a later felony prosecution. The candor this expectation promotes is
precisely that which the mediation privilege seeks to protect. It is also the
basis upon which many criminal courts throughout the country have
established victim-offender mediation programs, which have enjoyed great
success in misdemeanor, and, increasingly, felony cases. See generally,
Nancy Hirshman, Mediating Misdemeanors: Big Successes in Smaller
Cases, 7 DISP. RESOL MAG. 12 (Fall 2000); MARK S. UMBREIT, THE
HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION (2001). Public policy, for
example, specifically supports the mediation of gang disputes, for example,
and these programs may be less successful if the parties cannot discuss the
criminal acts underlying the disputes. CAL. PENAL CODE Section 13826.6
(West 1996) (mediation of gang-related disputes); COLO. REV. STAT.
Section 22-25-104.5 (1994) (mediation of gang-related disputes).
On the other hand, society's need for evidence to avoid an inaccurate
decision is greatest in the criminal context - both for evidence that might
convict the guilty and exonerate the innocent -- because the stakes of
human liberty and public safety are at their zenith. For this reason, even
without this exception, the courts can be expected to weigh heavily the
need for the evidence in a particular case, and sometimes will rule that the
See Rinaker v.
defendant's constitutional rights require disclosure.
Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 466 (Ct. App. 1998) (juvenile's
constitutional right to confrontation in civil juvenile delinquency trumps
mediator's statutory right not to be called as a witness); State v. Castellano,
460 So.2d 480 (Fla. App. 1984) (statute excluding evidence of an offer of
compromise presented to prove liability or absence of liability for a claim
or its value does not preclude mediator from testifying in a criminal
proceeding regarding alleged threat made by one party to another in
mediation). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
After great consideration and public comment, the Drafting
Committees decided to leave the critical balancing of these competing
interests to the sound discretion of the courts to determine under the facts
and circumstances of each case. Critically, it is drafted in a manner to
ensure that the same right to evidence introduced by the prosecution, thus

222

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22-2

assuring a level playing field. In addition, it puts the parties on notice of
this limitation on confidentiality.
11. SECTION 6(B)(2). VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT.

This exception is designed to preserve traditional contract defenses to
the enforcement of the mediated settlement agreement that relate to the
integrity of the mediation process, which otherwise would be unavailable if
based on mediation communications. A recent Texas case provides an
example. An action was brought to enforce a mediated settlement. The
defendant raised the defense of duress and sought to introduce evidence
that he had asked the mediator to permit him to leave because of chest
pains and a history of heart trouble, and that the mediator had refused to let
him leave the mediation session. See Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc., No. 14-9501292, 1996 WL 447954 (Tex App. 1996) (unpublished). The exception
might also allow party testimony in a personal injury case that the driver
denied having insurance, causing the plaintiff to rely and settle on that
basis, where such a misstatement would be a basis for reforming or
avoiding liability under the settlement. Under this exception the evidence
will not be privileged if the weighing requirements are met. This exception
differs from the exception for a record of an agreement in Section 6(a)(1) in
that Section 6(a)(1) only exempts the admissibility of the record of the
agreement itself, while the exception in Section 6(b)(2) is broader in that it
would permit the admissibility of other mediation communications that are
necessary to establish or refute a defense to the validity of a mediated
settlement agreement.
12. SECTION 6(c). MEDIATOR NOT COMPELLED.
Section 6(c) allows the mediator to decline to testify or otherwise
provide evidence in a professional misconduct and mediated settlement
enforcement cases to protect against frequent attempts to use the mediator
as a tie-breaking witness, which would undermine the integrity of the
mediation process and the impartiality of the individual mediator.
Nonetheless, the parties and others may testify or provide evidence in such
cases.
This Section is discussed in the comments to Sections 6(a)(7) and
6(b)(2). The mediator may still testify voluntarily if the exceptions apply,
or the parties waive their privilege, but the mediator may not be compelled
to do so.
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13. SECTION 6(D). LIMITATIONS ON EXCEPTIONS.

This Section makes clear the limited use that may be made of
mediation communications that are admitted under the exceptions
delineated in Sections 6(a) and 6(b). For example, if a statement
evidencing child abuse is admitted at a proceeding to protect the child, the
rest of the mediation communications remain privileged for that
proceeding, and the statement of abuse itself remains privileged for the
pending divorce or other proceedings.
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7. PROHIBITED MEDIATOR REPORTS

(a) Except as required in subsection (b), a mediator may not make a
report, assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other
communication regarding a mediation to a court, administrative agency, or
other authority that may make a ruling on the dispute that is the subject of
the mediation.
(b) A mediator may disclose:
(1) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a
settlement was reached, and attendance;
(2) a mediation communication as permitted under Section 6; or
(3) a mediation communication evidencing abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or exploitation of an individual to a public agency
responsible for protecting individuals against such mistreatment.
(c) A communication made in violation of subsection (a) may not be
considered by a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator.
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REPORTER'S NOTES

1. SECTION 7. DISCLOSURES BY THE MEDIATOR TO AN AUTHORITY THAT
MAY MAKE A RULING ON THE DISPUTE BEING MEDIATED.

Section 7(a) prohibits communications by the mediator in prescribed
circumstances. In contrast to the privilege, which gives a right to refuse to
provide evidence in a subsequent legal proceeding, this Section creates a
prohibition against disclosure.
Some states have already adopted similar prohibitions. See, e.g., CAL.
EVID. CODE Section 1121 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. Section 373.71
(1999) (water resources); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE Section 154.053
(c) (West 1999) (general). Disclosures of mediation communications to a
judge also could run afoul of prohibitions against ex parte communications
with judges. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL JUDGES, CANON
3(A)(3), 175 F.R.D. 364, 367 (1998); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT at 9. The purpose of
this Section is consistent with the conclusions of seminal reports in the
mediation field condemn the use of such reports as permitting coercion by
the mediator and destroying confidence in the neutrality of the mediator
and in the mediation process. See SOCIETY FOR PROFESSIONALS IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT
COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS (1991);
CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURTCONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS (D.C. 1992).
Importantly, the prohibition is limited to reports or other listed
communications to those who may rule on the dispute being mediated.
While the mediators are thus constrained in terms of reports to courts and
others that may make rulings on the case, they are not prohibited from
reporting threatened harm to appropriate authorities, for example, if learned
during a mediation to settle a civil dispute. In this regard, Section 7(b)(3)
responds to public concerns about clarity and makes explicit what is
otherwise implied in the Act, that mediators are not constrained by this
Section in their ability to disclose threats to the safety and well being of
vulnerable parties to appropriate public authorities, and is consistent with
the exception for disclosure in proceedings in Section 6(a)(7). Similarly,
while the provision prohibits mediators from making these reports, it does
not constrain the parties.
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The communications by the mediator to the court or other authority
are broadly defined. The provisions would not permit a mediator to
communicate, for example, on whether a particular party engaged in "good
faith" negotiation, or to state whether a party had been "the problem" in
reaching a settlement. Section 7(b)(1), however, does permit disclosure of
particular facts, including attendance and whether a settlement was
reached. For example, a mediator may report that one party did not attend
and another attended only for the first five minutes. States with "good
faith" mediation laws or court rules may want to consider the interplay
between such laws and this Section of the Act.
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SECTION

8. CONFIDENTIALITY

Unless subject to the [insert statutory references to open meetings act
and open records act], mediation communications are confidential to the
extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of this State.

REPORTER'S NOTES

This Section restates the general rule in the states regarding the
confidentiality of mediation communications outside the context of
proceedings.
Typically, confidentiality agreements are enforceable against a
signatory under state contract law, through damages and sometimes
specific enforcement. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc.2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d
668 (1977). This furthers the Act's underlying policy of party selfdetermination by permitting the parties to determine whether, when, and
how statements made in mediation may be disclosed to friends, family
members, business associates, the media and other third parties -- outside
the context of proceedings that are covered by the privilege. It also draws a
clear line to better guide the parties.
Section 8 was the culmination of efforts in several drafts to understand
and manage the reasonable expectations of mediation participants
regarding disclosures outside of proceedings. Early drafts were criticized
by some in the mediation community for failing to impose an affirmative
duty on mediation participants not to disclose mediation communications to
third persons outside of the context of the proceedings at which the Section
4 privilege applies. In several subsequent drafts, the Drafters attempted to
establish a rule that would prohibit such disclosures, but found it
impracticable to do so without imposing a severe risk of civil liability on
the many unknowing mediation participants who might discuss their
mediations with friends and family members, for example, for any number
of salutary reasons. In addition, the Drafters were deeply concerned about
their capacity to develop a truly comprehensive list of legitimate and
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appropriate exceptions -- such as for the education and training of
mediators, for the monitoring evaluation and improvement of court-related
mediation programs, and for the reporting of threats to police and abuse to
public agencies - as each draft drew forth more calls for legitimate and
appropriate exceptions. Similarly, efforts to create a simpler rule with
fewer exceptions but with greater judicial discretion to act as appropriate
on a case-by-case basis to prevent "manifest injustice" also met severe
resistance from many different sectors of the mediation community, as well
as a number of state Bar ADR committees.
Finally, recognizing the
important role of non-lawyer mediators and the many people who
participate in mediations without counsel or knowledge of the law, the
Drafters were concerned about the intelligibility and accessibility of the
provisions.
In the end, the Drafters ultimately chose to draw a clear line, and to
follow the general practice in the states of leaving the disclosure of
mediation communications outside of proceedings to the good judgment of
the parties to determine in light of the unique characteristics and
circumstances of their dispute.
Finally, special note should be made of the language "or provided by
other law or rule of this State." This language has two critical effects.
First, it makes clear that the Act does not preempt current court rules or
statutes that may impose a duty of confidentiality outside of proceedings.
See TEXAS CIV. PRAC. & REM. Section 154.073 (a) (arguably imposing a
duty of non-disclosure outside the context of proceedings). Second, the
language "or provided by other law or rule of this State" also puts parties
on ndtice that the parties' capacity to contract for this aspect of
confidentiality, while broad, is subject to the limitations of existing State
law. This recognizes the important policy choices that the State already has
made through its various mechanisms of law.
For example, such a contract would be subject to the rule in some
states that would permit or require a mediator to reveal information if there
is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer death or
substantial bodily harm if the mediator fails to take action necessary to
eliminate the treat. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (permitting action against
psychotherapist who knows of a patient's dangerousness and fails to warn
the potential victim). The mediator in such a case may first wish to secure
a determination by a court, in camera, that the facts of the particular case
justify or indeed dictate divulging the information to prevent reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm. See, e.g., ABA RULE 1.6(b)(1)
and accompanying commentary; 5 U.S.C. Section 574(a)(4)(C). This result
is consistent with the ABA/AAA/SPIDR Model Standards of Conduct for
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Mediators, and the American Bar Association's revised the Standards of
Conduct for Attorneys.
In addition, under contract law the courts may make exceptions to
enforcement for public policy reasons. See, e.g., Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Astra USA, 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996). Such
agreements are typically not enforceable by non-signatories. They are also
not enforceable if they conflict with public records requirements. See, e.g.
Anchorage School Dist. v. Anchorage Daily News, 779 P.2d 1191 (Alaska
1989); Pierce v. St. Vrain Valley School District, 1997 WL 94120 (Colo.
Ct. App. Div. 1 1997). The use of mediation communications as evidence
in proceedings is governed by Section 4-7, and the signatories of a
confidential agreement cannot expand the scope of the privilege.
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SECTION 9. MEDIATOR'S DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST;
BACKGROUND

(a) Before accepting a mediation, an individual who is requested to
serve as a mediator shall:
(1) make an inquiry that is reasonable under the circumstances to
determine whether there are any known facts that a reasonable
individual would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the
mediator, including a financial or personal interest in the
outcome of the mediation and an existing or past relationship
with a mediation party or foreseeable participant in the
mediation; and
(2) disclose any such known fact to the mediation parties as soon
as is practical before accepting a mediation.
(b) If a mediator learns any fact described in subsection (a)(1) after
accepting a mediation, the mediator shall disclose it as soon as is
practicable.
(c) At the request of a mediation party, an individual who is requested
to serve as a mediator shall disclose the mediator's qualifications to
mediate a dispute.
(d) A person that violates subsection [(a) or (b)][(a), (b), or (g)] is
precluded by the violation from asserting a privilege under Section 4.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), [and] (c), [and] [(g)] do not apply to an
individual acting as a judge.
(f) This [Act] does not require that a mediator have a special
qualification by background or profession.
[(g) A mediator must be impartial, unless after disclosure of the facts
required in subsections (a) and (b) to be disclosed, the parties agree
otherwise.]
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REPORTER'S NOTES

1. SECTIONS 9(A) AND 9(B). DISCLOSURE OF MEDIATOR'S CONFLICTS OF

INTEREST.

a. In General
This Section provides legislative support for the professional
standards requiring mediators to disclose their conflicts of interest. See,

e.g,

AMERICAN

ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION,

AMERICAN

BAR

ASSOCIATION & SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, STANDARD III (1995);

MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION,
STANDARD IV (2001); NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED

8.1(b) (1992). It is consistent with the
See REVISED
ethical obligations imposed on other ADR neutrals.
MEDIATION PROGRAMS, STANDARD

UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (2000) SECTION 12; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES,
SECTION 2(B) (1985) (required disclosures).

Sections 7(a)(2) and 7(b) make clear that the duty to disclose is a
continuing one.
b. Reasonable Duty Of Inquiry
The phrase in Section 9(b)(1) "make an inquiry that is reasonable
under the circumstances" makes clear that the mediator's burden of inquiry
into possible conflicts is not absolute, but rather is one that is consistent
with the purpose of the Section: to make the parties aware of any conflict
of interest that could lead the parties to believe that the mediator has an
interest in the outcome of the dispute. Such disclosure fulfills the
reasonable expectations of the parties, and furthers the Act's core principles
of party self-determination and informed consent by assuring the parties
that they will have sufficient information about the mediator's potential
conflicts of interests to make the determination about whether that mediator
is acceptable for the dispute at hand.
One may reasonably anticipate many situations in which parties are
willing to waive a conflict of interest; indeed, depending upon the dispute,
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the very fact that a mediator is familiar to both parties may best qualify the
mediator to mediate that dispute. That choice, however, properly belongs
to the parties after informed consent, and in preserving this autonomy, this
provision not only confirms the integrity of the individual mediator, but
also supports the integrity of the mediation process by providing a visible,
fundamental, and familiar safeguard of public protection.
Critically, the reasonable inquiry language is also intended to convey
the Drafters' intent to exclude inadvertent failures to disclose that would
result in the loss of the mediator privilege. The duty of reasonable inquiry
is specific to each mediation, and such an inquiry always would discover
those conflicts that are sufficiently material as to call for disclosure. For
example, stock ownership in a company that is a party to an employment
discrimination matter that is being mediated would likely be identified
under a reasonable inquiry, and should be disclosed to both parties under
Section 9(a). On the other hand, less substantial or merely arguable
conflicts of interest may not be discoverable upon reasonable inquiry and
that may therefore result in inadvertent nondisclosure. In the foregoing
hypothetical, for example, the mediator may not be aware, or have any
reason to be aware, that he or she has membership in the same country club
as an officer or board member of the company. The failure to disclose this
arguable conflict would be inadvertent, not a violation of Section 9(a) or
(b), and therefore not subject to the loss of privilege sanction in Section
9(d).
The reasonable inquiry also depends on the circumstances. For
example, if a small claims court refers parties to a mediator who has a
volunteer attorney standing in court, the parties would not expect that
mediator to check on conflicts with all lawyers in the mediator's firm in the
five minutes between referral and mediation. Presumably, only conflicts
known by the mediator would affect that mediation in any event.
c. Conflicts That Must Be Disclosed
Section 9(b)(1) expressly states that mediators should disclose
financial or personal interests, and personal relationships, that a
"reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the
mediator." However, the Drafters chose the word "including" to convey
their intent that these types of conflicts not be viewed as an exclusive list of
that which must be disclosed. Again, the standard is one of reasonableness
under the circumstances, given the Section's purpose in furthering
informed consent and the integrity of the mediation process.
It should be stressed that the Drafters recognize that it is sometimes
difficult for the practitioner to know precisely what must be disclosed
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under a reasonableness standard. Prudence, professional reputation, and
indeed common practice would compel the practitioner to err on the side of
caution in close cases. Moreover, mediators with full-time or otherwise
extensive mediation practices may wish to avail themselves of the common
technologies used by law firms to identify conflicts of interest. Finally in
this regard, it is worth underscoring that this duty to disclose conflicts of
interest is intended to further party self-determination and the integrity of
the mediation process, and is not intended to provide a cover or vehicle for
bad faith litigation tactics, such as fishing expeditions into a mediator's
professional or personal background. Such conduct would continue to be
subject to traditional sanction standards.
2. SECTION 9(C) AND (F). DISCLOSURE OF MEDIATOR'S QUALIFICATIONS.

Sections 9(c) and (f) address the issue of mediator qualifications, and,
like the conflicts of interest provision, are intended to further principles of
party autonomy and informed consent. In particular, these Sections do not
require mediators to have certain qualifications, specifically including a
law degree; nor, unlike the conflicts of interest provision, do they impose
an affirmative duty on the mediator to disclose qualifications. Rather, the
mediator's obligation is responsive: if a party asks for the mediator's
qualifications to mediate a particular dispute, the mediator must provide
those qualifications.
In some situations, the parties may make clear that they care about the
mediator's substantive knowledge of the context of the dispute, or that they
want to know whether the mediator in the past has used a purely facilitative
mediation process or instead an evaluative approach. Compare Leonard L.
Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Gridfor the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7
(1996) with Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator
Orientations: Piercing The "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. STATE UNIV. L. REV.
985 (1997); see generally Symposium, FLA. STATE UNIV. L. REV. (1997).
Experience mediating would seem important to some parties, and indeed
this is one aspect of the mediator's background that has been shown to
correlate with effectiveness in reaching settlement. See, e.g., Jessica
Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation Research Results, in
DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 429, 436 (Folberg &
Milne, eds., 1988); Roselle L. Wissler, A Closer Look at Settlement Week,
4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 28 (Summer 1998).
It must be stressed that the Act does not establish mediator
qualifications. No consensus has emerged in the law, research, or
commentary as to those mediator qualifications that will best produce
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effectiveness or fairness. As clarified by Section 9(f), mediators need not
be lawyers. In fact, the American Bar Association Section on Dispute
Resolution has issued a statement that "dispute resolution programs should
permit all individuals who have appropriate training and qualifications to
serve as neutrals, regardless of whether they are lawyers." ABA SECTION
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION COUNCIL RES., April 28, 1999.
At the same time, the law and commentary recognize that the quality
of the mediator is important and that the courts and public agencies
referring cases to mediation have a heightened responsibility to assure it.
See generally COLE ET AL., supra, Section 11.02 (discussing laws regarding
mediator qualifications); CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NATIONAL
STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS (1992);
SOCIETY FOR PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMISSION ON

QUALIFICATIONS, QUALIFYING NEUTRALS: THE BASIC PRINCIPLES (1989);

SOCIETY FOR PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMISSION ON
QUALIFICATIONS, ENSURING COMPETENCE AND QUALITY IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PRACTICE (1995); SOCIETY FOR PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION,
QUALIFYING
DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PRACTITIONERS:
GUIDELINES FOR COURT-CONNECTED PROGRAMS (1997).

The decision of the Drafting Committees against prescribing
qualifications should not be interpreted as a disregard for the importance of
qualifications. Rather, respecting the unique characteristics that may
qualify a particular mediator for a particular mediation, the silence of the
Act reflects the difficulty of addressing the topic in a uniform statute that
applies to mediation in a variety of contexts. Qualifications may be
important, but they need not be uniform. It is not the intent of the Act to
preclude a statute, court or administrative agency rule, arbitrator or contract
between the parties from requiring that a mediator have a particular
background or profession; those decisions are best made by individual
states, courts, governmental entities, and parties.
3. SECTION 9(D). VIOLATION OF DISCLOSURE [AND IMPARTIALITY]
REQUIREMENTS.

a. In General
This
disclosure
mediation
mediation

provision makes clear that the mediator who
requirements of Sections 9(a) or (b) may not refuse
communication or prevent another person from
communication of the mediator, pursuant to Section

violates the
to disclose a
disclosing a
4(b)(2). If a
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state adopts the impartiality provision of Section 9(f), a violation of that
provision triggers the same denial of the privilege. Only those states
adopting the impartiality provision should adopt the second bracket [(a),
(b), or (g)]; all other states should adopt the first bracket [(a) or (b)].
b. Only Mediator PrivilegeLost; Party,Nonparty ParticipantPrivileges
Remain Intact
Crucially, while the mediator who fails to comply with the Act's
conflicts of interest and impartiality requirements loses the privilege for
purpose of that mediation, the parties and the non-party participants retain
their privilege for that mediation. Thus, in a situation in which the
mediator has lost the privilege, for example, the parties may still come
forward and assert their privilege, thus blocking the mediator who has lost
the privilege from providing testimony about the affected mediation.
Similarly, to the extent the mediator's purported testimony would be about
the mediation communications of a nonparty participant, the nonparty
participant may block the testimony if the mediator has lost the privilege.
The only person prejudiced by the violation is the mediator who failed
to disclose a conflict [or who had a bias in the dispute], and as such the loss
of privilege provides an important but narrowly tailored measure of
accountability. Section 9(d) makes clear that mediators cannot avoid
testifying in such situations.
The Drafters considered other sanctions for mediators who failed to
disclose conflicts [or who were partial], such as criminal and civil
sanctions. However, it rejected specifically providing for those options
because of the possibility of discouraging people from becoming
mediators, and because the loss of privilege sanction was deemed to be
tailored to the precise harm caused by the violation.
c. PracticalOperation
The loss of privilege in this narrow context raises important practical
questions with regard to how a party or a nonparty participant would know
that the mediator may lose, or has lost, the privilege with respect to a
particular mediation. This is significant because they should have the
opportunity to decide whether they wish to assert their own privilege and
block the mediator's testimony to the extent permitted by the privilege, or
to permit the testimony, consistent with the Act's underlying premises of
party autonomy and informed consent.
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As a practical matter, notice is not likely to be a concern in the typical
case in which the mediation communications evidence is being sought in an
action to set aside the mediated settlement agreement, or in a professional
misconduct proceeding or action, arising out of the conflict of interest. The
parties would be aware of the loss of privilege, and indeed, the loss of the
privilege is consistent with the exceptions permitting such testimony in
cases to establish the validity of the settlement agreement or professional
misconduct. See Sections 6(a)(6) and 6(b)(2).
However, in the more remote situation in which these exceptions
would not be applicable, and the mediator's testimony is sought under a
claim that the privilege has been lost by virtue of the mediator's failure to
disclose a conflict of interest, the notice issue becomes more problematic.
It may be expected that the mediator would give notice to the other
mediation participants who may be affected by such a request. It may also
be expected under usual customs and practices that the party seeking the
privileged testimony would move the matter before a court and provide
notice to all interested persons who would have the right to assert the
privilege. For a challenge to the mediation privilege, those interested
parties would be the mediator, parties, and nonparty participants. In any
event, mediation participants are advised to consider including notice
provisions in their agreements to mediate that call for participants who
receive subpoenas for privileged testimony to provide notice to the other
participants of such a request.
As with the exceptions recognized under this Act, the Act anticipates
that the question of whether a privilege has been lost would typically be
decided by courts in an in camera proceeding that would preserve the
confidentiality of the mediation communications that may be necessary to
establish the validity of the loss of privilege claim. The materiality of the
failure to disclose is not likely to be in issue in the more common situations
in which the mediator's testimony is being sought in a case other than to
establish the invalidity of a mediated settlement agreement or professional
misconduct arising from the failure to disclose. However, in those rare
other situations in which the mediator's testimony is being sought, the
proponent of the evidence may also need to establish the materiality of the
failure to disclose.
4. SECTION 9(E). INDIVIDUAL ACTING AS A JUDGE.
This Section averts a legislative prohibition on certain judicial actions,
and defers to other more appropriate regulation of the judiciary. It extends
the principles embodied in Section 3(b)(3), which places mediations
conducted by judges who might make a ruling on the case outside the scope
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of the Act. The rationales described therein apply with equal force in this
context.
5. [SECTION 9(G). MEDIATOR IMPARTIALITY.]

This provision is bracketed to signal that it is suggested as a model
provision and need not be part of a Uniform Act. "Impartiality" has been
equated with "evenhandedness" in the Model Standards of Practice
approved by the American Bar Association, American Association of
Arbitrators, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (now
Association for Conflict Resolution). The mediator's employment situation
may present difficult issues regarding impartiality. A mediator who is
employed by one of the parties is not typically viewed as impartial,
especially if the person who mediates also represents a party. In the
representation situation, the mediator's overriding responsibility is toward a
single party. For example, the parties' legal counsel would not be an
impartial mediator. Ombuds often are obligated by ethical standards to be
impartial, although they are employed by one of the parties.
While few would argue that it is almost always best for mediators to
be impartial as a matter of practice, including such a requirement into a
uniform law drew considerable controversy. Some mediators, reflecting a
deeply and sincerely felt value within the mediation community that a
mediator not be predisposed to favor or disfavor parties in dispute,
persistently urged the Drafters to enshrine this value in the Act; for these,
the failure to include the notion of impartiality in the Act would be a
distortion of the mediation process. Other mediators, service providers,
judges, mediation scholars, however, urged the Drafters not to include the
term "impartiality" for a variety of reasons.
At least three are worth stressing. One pressing concern was that
including such a statutory requirement would subject mediators to an
unwarranted exposure to civil lawsuits by disgruntled parties. In this
regard, mediators with a more evaluative style expressed concerns that the
common practice of so-called "reality checking" would be used as a basis
for such actions against the mediator. A second major concern was over
the workability of such a statutory requirement. Scholarly research in
cognitive psychology has confirmed many hidden but common biases that
affect judgment, such as attributional distortions of judgment and
inclinations that are the product of social learning and professional
culturation. See generally, DANIEL KAHNEMAN AND AMOS TVERSKY,
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (2000); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY

OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING

(1993). Similarly, mediators in

certain contexts. sometimes have an ethical or felt duty to advocate on
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behalf of a party, such as long-term care ombuds in the health care context.
Third, some parties seek to use a mediator who has a duty to be partial in
some respects-such as a domestic mediator who is charged by law to
protect the interests of the children. It has been argued that such
mediations should still be privileged.
For these and other reasons, the Drafting Committees determined that
impartiality, like qualifications, was an issue that was important but that did
not need to be included in a uniform law. Rather, out of regard for the
gravity of the issue, the Drafting Committees determined that it was
enough to flag the issue for states to consider at a more local level, and to
provide model language that may be helpful to states wishing to pursue the
issue.
If this Section is adopted, the state should also chose the bracketed
option with this Section in Section (d), so that a mediator who is not
impartial is precluded from asserting the privilege. Section (e) makes this
inapplicable to an individual acting as a judge, whose impartiality is
governed by judicial cannons.
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SECTION 10. PARTICIPATION IN MEDIATION

An attorney or other individual designated by a party may accompany
the party to and participate in a mediation. A waiver of participation given
before the mediation may be rescinded.

REPORTER'S NOTES

The fairness of mediation is premised upon the informed consent of
the parties to any agreement reached. See Wright v. Brockett, 150 Misc. 2d
1031 (1991) (setting aside mediation agreement where conduct of
landlord/tenant mediation made informed consent unlikely); see generally,
Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 909, 936-944 (1998); Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers,
Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approaches to Ensuring Fairnessin Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV.
1317 (1995). Some statutes permit the mediator to exclude lawyers from
mediation, resting fairness guarantees on the lawyer's later review of the
draft settlement agreement. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE Section 3182 (West
1993); McEwen, et al., 79 MINN. L. REv., supra, at 1345-1346. At least
one bar authority has expressed doubts about the ability of a lawyer to
review an agreement effectively when that lawyer did not participate in the
give and take of negotiation. BOSTON BAR ASS'N, OP. 78-1 (1979).
Similarly, concern has been raised that the right to bring counsel might be a
requirement of constitutional due process in mediation programs operated
by courts or administrative agencies. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional
Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public
Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1095 (April 2000).
Some parties may prefer not to bring counsel. However, because of
the capacity of attorneys to help mitigate power imbalances, and in the
absence of other procedural protections for less powerful parties, the
Drafting Committees elected to let the parties, not the mediator, decide.
Also, their agreement to exclude counsel should be made after the dispute
arises, so that they can weigh the importance in the context of the stakes
involved.
The Act does not preclude the possibility of parties bringing multiple
lawyers or translators, as often is common in international commercial and
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other complex mediations. The Act also makes clear that parties may be
accompanied by a designated person, and does not require that person to be
a lawyer. This provision is consistent with good practices that permit the
pro se party to bring someone for support who is not a lawyer if the party
cannot afford a lawyer.
Most statutes are either silent on whether the parties' lawyers can be
excluded or, alternatively, provide that the parties can bring lawyers to the
sessions. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. Section 42-810 (1997) (domestic
relations) (counsel may attend mediation); N.D. CENT. CODE
Section 14-09.1-05 (1987) (domestic relations) (mediator may not exclude
counsel); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, Section 1824(5) (1998) (representative
authorized to attend); OR. REV. STAT. Section 107.600(1) (1981) (marriage
dissolution) (attorney may not be excluded); OR. REV. STAT.
Section 107.785 (1995) (marriage dissolution) (attorney may not be
excluded); WIS. STAT. Section 655.58(5) (1990) (health care) (authorizes
counsel to attend mediation). Several States, in contrast, have enacted
statutes permitting the exclusion of counsel from domestic mediation. See
CAL. FAM. CODE Section 3182 (West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
Section 40-4-302(3) (1997) (family); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS Section 254-59
(1996) (family); WIs. STAT. Section 767.11 (10)(a) (1993) (family).
As a practical matter, this provision has application only when the
parties are compelled to participate in the mediation by contract, law, or
order from a court or agency. In other instances, any party or mediator
unhappy with the decision of a party to be accompanied by an individual
can simply leave the mediation. In some instances, a party may seek to
bring an individual whose presence will interfere with effective discussion.
In divorce mediation, for example, a new friend of one of the parties may
spark new arguments. In these instances, the mediator can make that
observation to the parties and, if the mediation flounders because of the
presence of the nonparty, the parties or the mediator can terminate the
mediation. The pre-mediation waiver of this right of accompaniment can
be rescinded, because the party may not have understood the implication at
that point in the process. However, this provision can be waived once the
mediation begins. Limitations on counsel in small claims proceedings may
be interpreted to apply to the small claims mandatory mediation program.
If so, the States may wish to consider whether to provide an exception for
mediation conducted within these programs.
The right to accompaniment does not operate to excuse any
participation requirements for the parties themselves.
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SECTION 11. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND
NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT

This [Act] modifies, limits, or supersedes the federal Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001
et seq., but this [Act] does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of
that Act or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in
Section 103(b) of that Act.

REPORTER'S NOTES

This Section adopts standard language approved by the Uniform Law
Conference that is intended to conform Uniform Acts with the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) and its federal counterpart, Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign) (15 U.S.C
7001, etc seq. (2000).
Both UETA and E-Sign were written in response to broad recognition
of the commercial and other use of electronic technologies for
communications and contracting, and the consensus that the choice of
medium should not control the enforceability of transactions. These
Sections are consistent with both UETA and E-Sign. UETA has been
adopted by the Conference and received the approval of the American Bar
Association House of Delegates. As of December 2001, it had been
enacted in more than 35 states.
The effect of this provision is to reaffirm state authority over matters
of contract by making clear that UETA is the controlling law if there is a
conflict between this Act and the federal E-sign law, except for E-sign's
consumer consent provisions (Section 101(c) and its notice provisions
(Section 103(b) (which have no substantive impact on this Act). Among
other things, such clarification assures that agreements related to mediation
- such as the agreement to mediate and the subsequently mediated
settlement agreement - may not be challenged on the basis of a conflict
between this Act and the federal E-sign law. Such challenges should be
dismissed summarily by the courts.
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SECTION 12. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION

In applying and construing this [Act], consideration should be given to
the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter
among States that enact it.

REPORTER'S NOTES

One of the goals of the Uniform Mediation Act is to simplify the law
regarding mediation. Another is to make the law uniform among the
States. In most instances, the Act will render unnecessary the other
hundreds of different privilege statutes among the States, and these can be
repealed. In fact, to do otherwise would interfere with the uniformity of the
law.
However, the Drafters contemplate the Act as a floor in many aspects,
rather than a ceiling, one that provides a uniform starting point for
mediation but which respects the diversity in contexts, cultures, and
community traditions by permitting states to retain specific features that
have been tried and that work well in that state, but which need not
necessarily be uniform. For example, as noted after Section 4, those States
that provide specially that mediators cannot testify and impose damages
from wrongful subpoena may elect to retain such provisions. Similarly, as
discussed in the comments to Section 8, States with court rules that have
confidentiality provisions barring the disclosure of mediation
communications outside the context of proceedings may wish to retain
those provisions because they are not inconsistent with the Act.
As discussed in the preface, point 5, the constructive role of certain
laws regarding mediation can be performed effectively only if the
provisions are uniform across the States. See generally James J. Brudney,
Mediation and Some Lessons from the Uniform State Law Experience, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 795 (1998). In this regard, the law may serve
to provide not only uniformity of treatment of mediation in certain legal
contexts, but can serve to help define what reasonable expectations may be
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with regard to mediation. The certainty that flows from uniformity of
interpretation can serve to promote local, state, and national interests in the
expansive use of mediation as an important means of dispute resolution.
While the Drafters recognize that some such variations of the
mediation law are inevitable given the diverse nature of mediation, the
specific benefits of uniformity should also be emphasized. As discussed in
the Prefatory Notes, uniform adoption of the UMA will make the law of
mediation more accessible and certain in these key areas. Practitioners and
participants will know where to find the law, and they and courts can
reasonably anticipate how the statute will be interpreted. Moreover,
uniformity of the law will provide greater protection of mediation than any
one state has the capacity to provide. No matter how much protection one
state affords confidentiality protection, for example, the communication
will not be protected against compelled disclosure in another state if that
state does not have the same level of protection. Finally, uniformity has the
capacity to simplify and clarify the law, and this is particularly true with
respect to mediation confidentiality. Where many states have several
different confidentiality provisions, most of them could be replaced with an
integrated Uniform Mediation Act. Similarly, to the extent that there may
be confusion between states over which state's law would apply to a
mediation with an interstate character, uniformity simplifies the task of
those involved in the mediation by requiring them to look at only one law
rather than the laws of all affected states.
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SECTION 13. SEVERABILITY CLAUSE

If any provision of this [Act] or its application to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions
or applications of this [Act] which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this [Act] are
severable.

SECTION

14. EFFECTIVE DATE

This [Act] takes effect ....................

SECTION

15. REPEALS

The following acts and parts of acts are hereby repealed:

(1)
(2)
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REPORTER'S NOTES

The Uniform Mediation Act was drafted such that it can be integrated
into the fabric of most state legal regimes with minimal disruption of
current law or practices. In particular, it is not the intent of the UMA to
disrupt existing law in those few states that have well-established
For
mediation processes by statute, court rules, or court decisions.
example, its privilege structure, exceptions, etc., is consistent with most of
the hundreds of privilege statutes currently in the states.
Many of these can simply be repealed, and this Section provides the
vehicle for so doing. However, states should take care not to repeal
additional provisions that may be embedded within their state laws that
may be desirable and which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Act. An Act is still uniform if it provides for mediator incompetency or
provides for costs and attorneys fees to mediators who are wrongfully
subpoenaed. For example, in Ohio the Act would seem to replace the need
for the generic privilege statute, O.R.C. 2317.023, and that part of the
domestic mediation statute O.R.C. 3109.052 relating to privilege, but not
the public records exception, O.R.C. 149.43 or failure to report a crime,
O.R.C. 3109.052.
In contrast, Alabama has fewer statutes that would be subsumed by
the Act. For example, the Act would seem to replace the need for the
confidentiality provision in ALA. CODE 24-4-12 (communications during
conciliation sessions of complaints brought under Fair Housing Law are
confidential unless parties waive in writing). The Act would also subsume
certain sections of ALA. CODE 6-6-20, such as the definition of mediation
and the provision permitting attorneys or support persons to accompany
parties, but would not replace the provisions authorizing courts to refer
cases to mediation under certain conditions and defining sanctions.
Many of the existing statutes deal with matters not covered by the Act
and need not be repealed in order to provide uniformity because they would
not be superceded by the Act. Common examples include authorization of
mandatory mediation, standards for mediators, and funding for mediation
programs. Similarly, the Act would not supercede statutes relating to
mediator qualifications, such as O.R.C. 3109.052(A)(permitting local
courts to establish mediator qualifications) and O.R.C. 4117.02(E)
(authorizing state employment relations board to appoint mediators
according to training, practical experience, education, and character). In
such situations, an abundance of caution may counsel in favor of noting
specifically in this Section which provisions of current state laws are not
being repealed, as well as which ones are being repealed.

246

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 22-2

On the other hand, in those relatively few instances where the Act
directly conflicts, or may directly conflict, with existing state law, states
will want to consider the relationship between their current law and the
Act. The most prominent examples include those states that have
provisions barring attorneys from attending and participating in mediation
sessions, and those states that current permit or require mediators to make
reports to judges who may make rulings on the case.
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SECTION 16. APPLICATION To EXISTING AGREEMENTS OR
REFERRALS
(a) This [Act] governs a mediation pursuant to a referral or an
agreement to mediate made on or after [the effective date of this [Act]].
(b) On or after [a delayed date], this [Act] governs an agreement to
mediate whenever made.
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